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Measuring gender gaps in agriculture  
Although the importance of women’s contribution to the agricultural sector in developing 
countries is now widely acknowledged, there is little systematic evidence on how gender gaps in 
control over resources have changed over time in response to agricultural policy and 
technological interventions. In particular, few large-scale, national-level studies examine these 
effects for developing countries. This is surprising in light of the pervasive impact of agricultural 
technology and policy innovation on gender differences in control over productive resources for 
agriculture. Women are farmers and agricultural laborers in every part of the world. They are 
often responsible for the storage and processing of agricultural products. In some parts of the 
world, they play a key role in marketing crops. In almost all contexts, they play a central role in 
ensuring household food security, a goal that in turn affects crop choice and other agricultural 
decisions. Thus, every agricultural intervention is likely to impact women and, depending on the 
particular context of gender relations, impact them differently from men (Meinzen-Dick et al 
2011). 
This gap in research is an anomaly given the current pressure on agricultural research 
and development (R&D) to demonstrate and document reductions in gender inequality (FAO 
2010; World Bank 2012; ISPC 2014). Although studies investigating gender gaps in control over 
agricultural resources have recently increased in number and scope, the absence of national 
level data means these studies are often based on small samples and descriptive rather than 
analytical. This limits our ability to predict how technology and policy-based innovations will 
affect gender inequality and how gender might affect choices about technology, land, labor, and 
other productive resources.  
There is an unmet need for relatively simple, robust indicators that can be used for 
tracking short-to-medium outcomes of innovative technology, policy, and organizational 
interventions in an agricultural production process. This type of monitoring is especially needed 
to inform the design of interventions that may otherwise inadvertently change gender relations, 
and to provide timely corrective feedback if these generate or exacerbate gender gaps in 
unanticipated ways. This paper aims to guide the development of new indicators useful for 
seeking sharply focused feedback on a specific innovation in an agricultural production process. 
Specific innovation refers to the introduction of a new crop variety, livestock management 
regime, cropping system, resource conservation practice, or marketing arrangement, for 
example. Use of any of these can be constrained by gender inequality and can also alter it.  
In this respect, this analysis differs from efforts to build comprehensive measures of 
women’s control or empowerment that aggregate such effects. The paper argues that a change 
in one or more specific indicators of a gender gap in control over resources will not necessarily 




correlate with a change in women’s empowerment. Nonetheless, the indicators evaluated in this 
paper will be useful for monitoring whether an innovation in the agricultural production process 
is on track toward reducing gender equality and increasing the well-being of women and men.   
 The development of suitable indicators for this purpose faces a number of difficulties. 
Apart from a deficit of national-level data, there is a lack of agreement about the definition and 
measurement of indicators of gender gaps in control over agricultural resources. Developing 
robust indicators requires a level of conceptual clarity on causal pathways, on the definition of 
“control” over resources, and on appropriate data collection procedures – such as the question 
of who should be interviewed and whether the appropriate unit of analysis is an individual or 
household. Furthermore, the indicators and data collection methods chosen must strike a 
balance between conceptual clarity and logistical feasibility, particularly if the goal is to track the 
indicators over time.  
Despite these difficulties, this paper explores the extent to which it is possible to define 
simple, robust indicators of gender gaps in use and control over resources that are likely to 
impact and be affected by agricultural innovation. To address this question, the paper makes 
the following contributions to the literature: 
1. The identification of conceptual criteria of particular importance for developing 
robust, rich indicators of change in gender gaps and for evaluating their utility 
2. Analysis of the robustness and feasibility of the gender gap indicators used by 
published studies, from which we generate a “menu” of potentially useful indicators 
3. Recommendations for indicators based on evaluation of the menu of indicators 
identified in (2)  
4. A review of sources of national-level data currently available and suggestions for 
data that need to be collected for constructing these indicators 
 The target audience for recommendations are researchers and development 
practitioners involved in designing and implementing agricultural innovations who need to 
monitor the direct and indirect impacts. These indicators are relevant primarily for users whose 
main objective is not the study of gender relations but who need evaluations of the effect of 
specific innovations on women’s ability to control resources.    
 With this application in mind, the paper also proposes a short “dashboard” of indicators. 
The purpose of the dashboard is to provide feedback in the short term to ensure that innovators 
are alerted if gender gaps seem to worsen. The dashboard is intended to make it easy for 
innovators to re-evaluate the design and implementation of an intervention in an agricultural 
production process while it is in progress. By short term, we mean within no more than three to 
five years after the introduction of an innovation while there is still time for the intervention to 
self-correct, and before final impacts can be measured or even achieved. The dashboard we 
have compiled based on available data or existing data collection instruments has several 




limitations, discussed later in the paper. However, based on the information in this paper, 
potential users could adapt this dashboard to serve their goals. 
This analysis is motivated by the conviction that gender inequality matters for 
“evaluative” reasons, as a desirable end in itself (Sen 1999). Although it is tempting to argue 
that decreases in gender inequalities in turn result in greater adoption and use of agricultural 
innovations, the evidence on this is somewhat mixed, in part because the innovations 
themselves have often been generated without consideration of gender relations. Although this 
paper does not address gender inequalities in the development of technologies, , there is a 
need for greater consideration of women’s needs and voices in the research and development 
process that leads to the development of agricultural technology. 
 
What do we seek to measure?  
The central question that that each of the recommended indicators will help answer is 
“What are the gender differences in control over key resources in the agricultural production 
process?” As discussed in detail in the next section, developing a refined notion of control is a 
necessary prelude to answering this question.  
 
Definition of control in an agricultural production process  
These indicators are restricted to understanding the agricultural production process, 
which are the transactions (human, financial, natural, political, and social) that occur on a farm 
or in a farming system supporting the agricultural livelihoods of men, women, and children. 
Land, livestock, common property resources such as water and forest resources, financial 
assets, and labor power are the key resources in this production process.1 In each case, we 
then recommend indicators of women’s ability to exercise rights over these resources as well as 
equivalent indicators for men’s ability to exercise rights over these same resources; both are 
necessary to measure changing gender gaps. We also consider measures of women’s and 
men’s ability to control household income and participate in extra-household collective decision-
making processes. These are important indicators of the extent to which individuals are able to 
influence the economic and political contexts that will shape their access to resources in the 
future (Meinzen-Dick et al 2011).   
                                               
1This report uses the definition of data, metrics, and indicators employed in the 2014 ISPC report on Data, Metrics 
and Monitoring in CGIAR (ISPC 2014). Metrics are thus computed by aggregating raw data, while indicators are 
summary measures that reflect system properties. The ISPC report argues that metrics become indicators when they 
are used for decision-making; thus, “all indicators are metrics, but not vice versa.” 
 




Computation of gender gaps 
For each indicator we recommend, we present two components: one that measures 
women’s rights over that particular resource and one that measures men’s. Table 1 illustrates 
how these two measures comprise the constituent elements of any measure of a gender gap 
although computation of the gender gap itself can take many forms. As summarized in Table 1, 
a gender gap can be expressed in terms of the ratio of the female measure to the male 
measure, the absolute difference between the male and female measures, or the percentage 
difference between them, with either the male or the female measure as the baseline.2  
Table 1: Computing a gender gap indicator 
Constituent measures: 
1. Indicator of men's resource rights, for example, the proportion of men who own land, m1 
2. Indicator of women's resource rights, for example, the proportion of women who own land, f1 
As an example, if f1 = 10% or 0.1 and m1 = 50% or 0.5. 
 
Forms of the gender gap: 
1. A ratio of the female to male measure: f1/m1 
where 1 signals no gender gap, 
<1 indicates a gender gap in favor of men, and 
>1 indicates a gender gap in favor of women. 
In this case: gap = 1/5 or 0.2. 
  
2. The difference between the female and male measures: f1 ‒ m1 
where 0 signals no gender gap, 
<0 indicates a gender gap in favor of men, and 
>0 indicates a gender gap in favor of women.  
In this case, gap = 0.1 ‒ 0.5 = ‒0.4. 
  
3. The percentage difference between the female and male measures, with the male measure as the 
base: 100* (f1 ‒ m1)/m1  
where 0 signals no gender gap, 
<0 signals a gender gap in favor of men, and  
>0 signals a gender gap in favor of women. 
The size of the gender gap is normalized against the proportion of male landowners. In this case, gap = 
‒80%. 
  
4.The percentage difference between the female and male measures, with the female measure as the 
base: 100* (f1 ‒ m1)/f1  
where 0 signals no gender gap, 
<0 signals a gender gap in favor of men, and  
>0 signals a gender gap in favor of women. 
The size of the gender gap is normalized against the proportion of female landowners. In this case, gap 
= ‒400%. 
                                               
2 For simplicity, we prefer the ratio of the female measure to the male measure, expressed as a percentage. This is a 
gender gap measure that is familiar in that it resembles the components of the UN Gender Inequality Index, while 
also being relatively easy to interpret. 
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Interpretation of gender gaps 
Whatever the form of the final gender gap computation, a narrowing of the gender gap is 
not desirable if it is the result of a “race to the bottom” – when the gap is narrowed entirely 
because rural men are worse off, as, for example, when they lose control over resources. It is 
therefore important for researchers to establish a baseline and maintain data on the constituent 
elements of any gender gap calculation.  
Decreasing gender gaps within agriculture (even where there is no “race to the bottom”) 
does not necessarily imply an overall increase in women’s empowerment. The debate is 
ongoing about the degree to which a feminization of the agricultural workforce is occurring in 
different parts of the world, but what is less controversial is the fact that agriculture across most 
of Asia, Latin America, and Africa is the “lesser half” of a diversified livelihood structure in which 
nonfarm work, often in urban and peri-urban areas, is key to mobility and income growth 
(Razavi 2009). Thus, women’s increasing control over agricultural resources and decision-
making may not imply that they necessarily have a greater voice or power in the local or 
national economy.  
In this respect, our goal is complementary to, but distinct from, recent projects such as 
the Women’s Empowerment in Agriculture Index (WEAI), which creates a single index of 
women’s overall degree of empowerment in agricultural societies, both within and outside of 
agricultural production processes (Alkire et al 2013). We do not seek to measure overall 
empowerment but rather gender gaps in control over specific resources in the agricultural 
production process. For agricultural R&D, when designing and implementing specific 
interventions, such as the introduction of a new crop variety or livestock feeding regime, 
identifying an effect on aggregate empowerment may be difficult to detect and not very 
informative. For example, a decrease in aggregate empowerment correlated with the 
introduction of a new variety begs the question of whether gender differences in preferred 
varietal traits or access to seed, fertilizer, land, or extension training were the primary obstacle. 
Without information on specific gender gaps and their contribution to a particular outcome, it is 
difficult for to correct the intervention.  
Thus, we are not proposing a single index, but rather a range of indicators along with 
criteria for evaluating the contexts in which they may work best. The type of monitoring and 
evaluation process we aim to support with recommended indicators needs to generate feedback 
about changes in gender equality in the short and medium term in order to self-correct. 
Therefore, the proposed indicators build on existing data and are both specific and sensitive to 
change in the short as well as medium to long term. As noted below, measures of the value 
(rather than quantity) of resources controlled by men and women may be especially well suited 




to capturing changes in the short term, even if they remain logistically difficult to generate (Doss 
et al 2013).   
 In the following section, we begin by discussing the criteria that emerged out of the 
literature review as well as some of the potential challenges of trying to satisfy these criteria. We 
then apply these criteria to generate a set of recommended indicators and evaluate the extent to 
which they meet our various criteria. 
 
CRITERIA FOR MEASURING GENDER GAPS IN RESOURCES 
 This section presents ten criteria derived from the literature review that can be used to 
evaluate the utility of indicators proposed for measuring gender gaps in control over resources 
used in an agricultural production process. Of these, five are conceptual while the remaining 
relate to issues of measurement. Conceptual criteria are important because the statement that a 
woman or man “has control over a resource” raises a number of difficult questions. Do we mean 
this individual is the only one with control? Or do we mean this individual has shared (or joint) 
control? (Deere and Doss 2006). And, what do we mean by control, since use, control, and 
ownership are related but somewhat different sets of rights (Meinzen-Dick et al 2011). 
Furthermore, rights that exist “on paper” (de jure rights) may not always exist on the ground (de 
facto rights). If we want to measure gender gaps in such rights, there is also the complication 
that rights over resources have traditionally been measured at the level of the household and 
that the focus has often been on the physical quantity, rather than the value, of resources (Doss 
et al 2015). In this section, we begin by discussing the conceptual criteria that we apply to 
identify robust indicators of such gender gaps.  
Collecting the data for indicators that meet these criteria raises measurement issues. We 
therefore also develop and discuss criteria for evaluating indicators against these measurement 
issues. For example, given the complex conceptual issues that are raised by an attempt to 
measure gender gaps in agricultural resources, more nuanced indicators are also likely to be 
somewhat resource intensive to construct and track over time. Our aim is to minimize the 
resource intensity of data collection to the extent possible, but some indicators perform better on 
that criterion than others.  
We recommend only indicators that meet at least the first four conceptual criteria and the 
first two measurement criteria summarized in Box 1. As discussed in the review of the literature 
that follows in the next section, and is summarized in the tables in Appendix 2, we evaluate our 
indicators against all of the criteria and note the degree to which these criteria are met.  
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Box 1. Criteria for evaluating indicators of gender gaps in control over productive 
resources 
Conceptual issues: Does the indicator of a gender gap  
 capture the differences between control and use rights: where rights to control (to manage, 
exclude others or alienate the resource) may not be the same as rights to use (to access the 
resource and withdraw the output)? 
 capture de facto rights in preference to de jure rights? 
 measure joint rights (shared among individuals but not necessarily equal) as well as sole 
rights? 
 disaggregate rights and decision-making by sex of the respondent rather than by sex of the 
household head? 
 measure the value of resources as well as (or instead of) the quantity of resources?  
 
Measurement issues: Is the gender gap indicator based on  
 quantitative data, with qualitative validation? 
 data that can be readily collected at several different points in time? 
 data that are easily replicable across sites, countries, or regions? 
 data that are not resource intensive to collect because they are already being collected at 
scale or could feasibly be included in a large-scale survey? 
 short- or medium-term outcomes (as distinct from impacts that take a long time for 
measureable change to occur), especially gaps related to use and to the value of resources? 
 
 
1. Does the gender gap indicator capture layered rights: use, control, and 
ownership? 
In the conventional economics literature, ownership is equated with individual property 
rights, in particular the rights to exclude and alienate. The argument made is that such rights 
maximize the incentives of resource owners to invest in and improve the productivity of their 
resources. However, in a paradox often noted by feminists, the advocacy of this system appears 
to end where the household begins (Agarwal 1994, 1997). Economists have been content to 
measure ownership at the household rather than individual level, and to assume that the (male) 
household head is the owner of such property (Deere and Doss 2006). And, while in the last two 
decades the notion of the “unitary household” has fallen out of favor in mainstream analyses of 
consumption and labor allocation, few data exist on the intra-household distribution of wealth 
and property. In agricultural settings, we have learned a great deal about women’s participation 
in agricultural labor (as family and wage workers), but far less about their use of and control 
over other productive resources, including the labor of others.   
 More recently, a small body of literature has begun to examine the extent and 
implications of intra-household gender gaps in asset ownership. These studies show that 
women across the world tend to own fewer assets and own assets of lower value than men 
(Deere and León 2001, Doss et al 2014b). However, this literature also shows that traditional 
measures of asset ownership collected at the household rather than intra-household level can 




sharply underestimate the extent to which women claim and exercise rights over productive 
assets, including in agriculture (Twyman et al 2015). The lack of data on such rights at the intra-
household level then means that agricultural intervention programs may not be reaching 
household members with the de facto ability to affect the uptake of new agricultural production 
technologies. 
 Conceptually, thinking about the distribution of property rights within households requires 
thinking about the layering of rights since different members of the household may have 
different rights ranging from use to control, and to the right to alienate (Johnson et al 2015). 
Thus, the husband may claim the right to sell or rent the home, but the wife uses and may 
participate in decision-making about improvements to the home. She may thus have substantial 
incentives to maintain and upgrade her home even in the absence of rights to alienate and 
exclude. Indeed, efforts to maintain and upgrade the home may fail without her cooperation and 
active participation. 
These critiques of mainstream understandings of property rights echo those in the 
literature on common pool resources. There too, layers of rights exist across different 
community members, producing incentives for resource maintenance and improvement that do 
not always align with the predictions of mainstream economists. The literature on gendered 
rights over resources thus draws upon the framework developed in this literature on common 
pool resource management even if most of that latter literature does not itself enter within the 
walls of the household (Doss and Meinzen-Dick 2015).  
Schlager and Ostrom (1992) identify rights over resources as extending from (i) entry or 
access (physically accessing the resource, for example: stepping onto the land), (ii) withdrawal 
(the ability to use the output from the resource), (iii) management rights or decision-making 
about the use of the resource (including crop choice and choice of agricultural technologies), (iv) 
exclusion rights, and (v) rights of alienation (decision-making about the sale, lease, transfer, or 
bequeathing of the resource). 
 They point out that in most cases entry rights are bundled together with withdrawal rights 
to comprise operational rights that help allocate current benefits from resource use. However, 
the remaining three rights they classify as collective choice rights that allow holders of such 
rights to determine future operational rights. From the mainstream efficiency perspective, the 
latter may be decisive in shaping incentives to improve and maintain the resource, as opposed 
to allowing it to degrade. From an equity perspective, the latter also more strongly shape the 
ability to accumulate wealth and thus the degree of wealth inequality, which is a key 
consequence of differential rights to assets and resources.   
We follow this literature in grouping together entry and withdrawal rights as “use or 
access” rights and rights to make decisions about management, exclusion, and alienation as 
“control” rights.  In the case of physical resources such as land and livestock, data on patterns 




of labor allocation can help us obtain a sense of a person’s “entry” rights of access to such 
resources. Withdrawal rights, on the other hand, require not only the ability to access output 
from the resources (for example, harvest the crop) but also the ability to exercise some measure 
of influence over how the output is used (whether to sell or eat the harvest, for example).3 In this 
paper, we therefore propose using indicators of labor use to track some patterns of access 
to/use of land and livestock while also proposing indicators of control over the resource output 
to capture withdrawal rights.  
Thus, “control rights” capture the degree to which women and men are able to exercise 
management, exclusion, and alienation rights over the resource itself, and we propose some 
indicators of control rights across different resources. Throughout the paper, we treat these 
“control rights” as more decisively linked to gender equity and potential long-term changes in the 
gender wealth gap. 
The term “ownership” in the Schlager and Ostrom formulation refers to the existence of 
all five kinds of rights bundled together. Thus, a woman may be said to own land if she, 
individually or jointly, holds all these five rights to land. However, as Doss et al (2013) point out, 
in different contexts, women and men may use the word ownership to address varying subsets 
of these rights. In particular, the right to alienate may not exist in regions where markets for 
resources are thin or nonexistent, so “ownership” may refer only to use, management, and 
exclusion rights. The term ownership is often used in such contexts to mean formally recognized 
use and control rights (usually including some rights to exclude others), that may or may not be 
accompanied by the right to alienate the land without the agreement of others.  
 In thinking about indicators that both build upon existing data sets but are also 
conceptually clear, we thus face something of a conundrum. Although we conceptualize 
ownership as the “super set” of these five rights, this more specific definition prevents us from 
using many existing data sets that are building questions about ownership into their surveys 
without specifying which of the rights the term refers to. In some contexts, such surveys may be 
the only information available about the intra-household distribution of rights over productive 
resources. Furthermore, these indicators, while varying in meaning, do capture what 
anthropologists would call “local knowledge” about ownership and thus perhaps describe the de 
facto situation on the ground. 
 One recommendation that emerges from this is the need for indicators of use and control 
that do not use the word ownership per se. However, we do want to make use of available data 
on ownership, even while urging greater attention to these conceptual issues on the part of 
those developing such data sets. Thus, where indicators of “ownership” are available, we do 
                                               
3 This means that slave and wage laborers engaged in harvesting would not have withdrawal rights by this definition. 




recommend using them, with the caveat that such indicators may not be easy to aggregate 
across contexts, since they may incorporate very different bundles of rights in different contexts.  
 
2. Does the gender gap indicator measure for de facto as against de jure rights? 
In developing countries, weak states and the co-existence of traditional and modern 
constitutional legal systems often mean that there can be considerable divergence between 
documented claims that can hold up in formal courts of law and what the community accepts as 
a legitimate claim or right. A “legally pluralistic” approach that does not rely only on documented 
formal claims of ownership is thus necessary to understand ownership as it exists on the ground 
(Doss et al 2014a). Although the evidence suggests that women have fewer ownership rights 
than men to most kinds of productive assets across the world, it is not clear which system, 
customary or statutory constitutional, is more biased against women. In some contexts, such as 
traditionally matrilineal communities, custom may provide women with more ownership rights 
than formal legal systems, while in others the situation may be reversed.4  
On the other hand, de facto access to resources may not match the patterns of 
ownership. Thus, a woman who owns land in her natal village may have little ability to use it 
after moving to her husband’s village, while women without de jure rights to land may be able to 
use land owned by their husband’s family (Hare et al 2007, Lin and Lixin 2006). De jure and de 
facto rights thus overlap but are not synonymous with each other.  
From the perspective of understanding the gendered impact of agricultural interventions, 
it is useful to consider de facto rather than de jure claims. The recommended indicators are 
based on self-reported “subjective” survey responses rather than on “objective” evidence of 
documentation. This is not just a matter of pragmatics, but rather is grounded in the 
understanding that marginalized groups are unlikely to have official claims to resources and that 
efforts to work with such groups require us to acknowledge and validate the strength of their 
“informal” claims to resources (Doss et al 2014a. Johnson et al 2015).  
 
3. Does the gender gap indicator capture sole as well as joint rights? 
As discussed above, there is a literature on “collective rights” over common pool 
resources. Such “collective rights” exist where rights of use and control are vested in a 
community or a collective body such as a water user group, both existing as aggregates of 
member households (Meinzen Dick and Knox 1999, Ostrom 2003). Although collective rights 
imply some degree of jointness in the exercise of rights, rights are jointly claimed and exercised 
                                               
4 In both China and Rwanda, state-led allocation of land and regularization of land tenure appear to have been more 
favorable to women than custom may have been (Hare et al 2007, Ali et al 2011). 




within the household as well. Most household assets are used and accessed by multiple 
members of a household, with patterns of use by each individual varying seasonally and/or with 
changes in the demographic composition of the household. This sharing of rights among 
individuals is what we mean here by “jointness” in rights.  
Since women’s access to assets is often mediated through their families, they are more 
likely to be joint rather than sole owners of assets (Johnson et al 2015). They are also more 
likely to participate in decision-making together with other family members rather than alone. In 
certain countries, the marital regime – whether there is community property or separation of 
property within the marriage – results in spouses owning property jointly even in de jure terms 
(Deere et al 2013). 
As discussed below, we do not privilege individual or sole use and control of assets over 
joint use and control, given that the ultimate goal is one where women and men can participate 
as equals in the common project of ensuring the well-being of a household or community (Deere 
and Twyman 2012). We do emphasize, however, that jointness does not mean equality. To a 
greater degree than joint rights, sole rights may improve exit options in ways that enhance intra-
household bargaining power (Agarwal 1997). Nevertheless, indicators that do not measure joint 
rights to assets fail to capture the lived reality of gendered patterns of access to resources. In 
the resource-scarce agricultural contexts of the developing world, joint and collective rights may 
also be the only feasible way to ensure broader access to assets for marginalized populations 
(Rao 2006, Agarwal 2010b). We recommend that data be collected on sole as well as joint use 
and control of resources so that researchers can combine them when appropriate but also be 
able to analyze any differences between the two.  
 
4. Does the gender gap indicator disaggregate rights and decision-making by sex 
of the respondent rather than the household head?   
 As the social construction of biological difference, gender is a relational concept that 
cannot be understood by studying either men or women in isolation from each other. The 
extensive focus on female-headed households in prior research on agricultural contexts is thus 
problematic in that it does not help us grasp the nature of gendered rights within the dual-
headed households within which a majority of women live (Deere et al 2012). We use the 
language of comparing dual-headed and single-headed households (rather than female- and 
male-headed) and urge the development of indicators that look within both. In this review, we 
largely exclude studies that simply compare female-headed households with male-headed 
households.  
 The definition of rights we use is measured on the ground by a respondent’s ability to 
influence decision-making about the use of the resource and/or the output from the resource. 




Almost all the indicators we recommend thus require data on decision-making by women and 
men separately. The Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS) module on decision-making 
about expenditure on daily goods and major goods, mobility, and health is an important example 
of an ongoing attempt to collect data on decision-making (Subaiya and Kishor 2008). The recent 
WEAI index also collects data on decision-making about agricultural production.   
In the case of the DHS, however, questions on decision-making are answered only by 
female members of the household. We argue here that surveys on decision-making should 
comprise male and female respondents within both dual- and single-headed households. 
Gender gaps in the exercise of rights over resources require data on decision-making from both 
men and women. Extending surveys on decision-making to male and female respondents is 
thus a key recommendation we make here. 
In the interests of logistical feasibility, we do not recommend the more resource-
intensive process of asking men and women within the same household to answer these 
decision-making questions. We acknowledge that this would produce a much richer picture of 
intra-household dynamics, but our goal here is to develop feasible indicators of gender gaps in 
control over resources rather than to fully probe the intra-household dynamics of cooperation 
and conflict. The Gallup/World Bank Findex survey provides a good example of the kind of 
sampling methodology we consider practical. The survey collects data via telephone and face-
to-face interviews on the financial usage of one respondent from each household surveyed. This 
sampling strategy therefore ensures the inclusion of women respondents. 
We should note that, as Deere and Twyman (2012) point out, an implicit assumption in 
many studies of decision-making is that, when a woman has the sole or final say in an aspect of 
decision-making, this represents a greater degree of female empowerment. On the other hand, 
depending on the local gender division of labor, women having the final say in certain zones of 
decision-making can simply be a sign that the household follows gender norms that may be 
quite regressive for women overall. The desired goal may instead be joint decision-making in 
which the members of the household participate as equals. Consistent with the rest of the 
paper, therefore, we consider jointness in decision-making to be a legitimate indicator of female 
voice.  
One approach is to provide response options to decision-making questions that include 
not just “alone,” “jointly with someone else,” and “entirely by someone else” but an additional 
category of “not an area of decision-making because we are following norms”. This option may 
capture the areas of decision-making that default to men and women due to custom, rather than 
representing enhanced bargaining power Holvoet (2005).5 It is not clear yet how logistically 
                                               
5 Holvoet (2005, 79) reports that “the category of ‘norm-following’ was less obvious as none of the interviewees 
literally used the notion of ‘norm-following.’ Rather, they responded in such terms as ‘nobody’; ‘it is natural, we do not 
need to take a decision on that’; ‘we do not really decide on that, we just do like we always have done’; ‘this is what 
we always do, we do not need to take a decision on this’; ‘it is normal, everybody/nobody does.’”  




feasible such an option would be across locations, so we mark it as a possibility for 
consideration in the future.  
5. Does the gender gap indicator measure the value of resources as well as (or 
instead of) the quantity of resources?  
Technology-based innovations are likely to change the relative returns to different 
productive assets and thus their value. In the case of land, without substantial land reform policy 
from the government, patterns of control over land are deeply rooted in inheritance regimes and 
are unlikely to change easily. Allocations of labor are also often the result of long-standing 
norms that govern the gender division of labor. Although the prices of resources are also 
influenced by deep-rooted forces of tradition and/or discrimination, the introduction of new 
technologies may more easily change the value of resources and thus gender value gaps in 
resources, for better or for worse. From a tracking perspective, shifts in value may thus be more 
sensitive indicators of technological impacts.  
As we discuss below, such changes in resource value are difficult to measure, 
particularly in contexts in which markets are thin. As a result, indicators of such changes may 
not always be feasible. Nevertheless, we urge greater consideration of such indicators by data 
collection agencies given their relative sensitivity to changes in the wider socioeconomic 
context.  
6. Is the gender gap indicator based on quantitative data, with qualitative 
validation?  
The need to measure change over time favors the creation of a quantitative indicator. All 
our recommended indicators are quantitative for this reason. However, since these are 
quantitative measures based on household survey instruments, they require prior qualitative 
work both to verify the relevance of the indicator in that particular context and to validate the 
results of the quantitative measures. Qualitative work is also required to understand exactly 
what it means that the indicator has changed and to disentangle alternative interpretations of 
some of these changes.  
7. Is the gender gap indicator based on data that can be readily collected at 
several different points in time?  
Most of the current empirical studies on gender gaps are small-scale studies that do not 
claim to be nationally representative. Although an understanding of the specificities of the local 
is extremely important, there is value in having some indicators that are produced at the national 
level to allow for comparisons between countries. This is particularly true when agricultural 
technologies are introduced on a large scale and benchmarks to track progress are also 
required at that scale. In this paper, we focus on indicators that can be “scaled up” even as we 




acknowledge the limitations of such indicators and recommend local-level qualitative work to 
tease out what changes in these indicators truly mean on the ground.  
As discussed earlier, it is very important for an indicator to facilitate tracking gender gaps 
over time. Simple, robust national-level data that can be integrated into existing surveys can 
help accomplish that goal. 
 
8. Is the gender gap indicator designed to minimize data requirements?  
One of our goals was to suggest indicators in forms that minimize the resource intensity 
of the data-gathering process. For example, we do not recommend indicators that require 
sampling men and women within the same household despite the richness of the data 
generated. We also discuss relatively simple forms of time-use surveys below. 
We are especially interested in minimizing the need for additional primary data 
collection. Thus, one criterion in evaluating possible indicators is the potential for integration 
with existing forms of national and international data. Table 2 lists large household surveys that 
have this potential. In particular, we looked for indicators that used data that is or could be 
collected in the following existing international surveys: the DHS (Demographic and Health 
Surveys), the LSMS (the Living Standards Measurement Surveys), the WEAI (Women’s 
Empowerment in Agriculture Index), and the Global Findex survey.  
 
Table 2: List of national multi-year household surveys referred to in the paper 




LSMS and LSMS-ISA World Bank http://go.worldbank.org/BCLXW38HY0  
Demographic and Health 
Surveys (DHS) 
The DHS Program www.dhsprogram.com/ 
Women’s Empowerment in 
Agriculture Index (WEAI) 
IFPRI, USAID, and the 
OHPI 
www.ifpri.org/topic/weai-resource-center  
Global Findex Survey World Bank www.worldbank.org/en/programs/globalfind
ex  
   
   
 
9. Is the gender gap indicator based on data that are easily replicable across 
sites, countries, or regions? 
Replicability, or a degree of universality that would allow the indicator to be meaningful 
across contexts and across time, is also an important criterion. Although inter-country and intra-
country regional differences are always important, we attempted to select indicators that 
minimize such differences. In some instances, this has meant choosing less specific versions of 
indicators. In other cases, such as the example of land ownership data above, we recognize 




that replicability remains a challenge. In Appendix Table 2, we flag some possible problems with 
replicability that we anticipate in the indicators we have selected.  
 
10. Is the gender gap indicator sensitive to short- and medium-term change? 
In order for the indicators to help assess the impact of technological changes, a subset 
needs to be especially sensitive to early signs of setbacks or progress in the achievement of 
women’s control over assets and decision-making. Since such evaluations occur within a few 
years, our goal was to identify a range of indicators, some of which could track short-term 
changes (3-5 years) and some medium- and long-term changes (more than 5 years). 
Developing such a range of indicators would also allow us to see whether any changes, for 
better or for worse, were limited only to the short run and reversed themselves in the long run.  
Given that studies that measure changes across time do not yet exist in the case of most 
indicators we recommend, our analysis of the time sensitivity of indicators is based on our 
conceptual framework. This suggests that indicators related to use and to the value of resources 
are somewhat more likely to change in the short term than indicators of control and of the 
quantity of resources controlled. Most fundamentally, the more control over a particular resource 
is shaped by deep-rooted norms about gender, the less likely it is to change in the short run.  
During the course of our literature review, we were struck by the paucity of studies that 
do indeed track indicators over time. Some efforts in this direction, such as the Findex and 
WEAI, are extremely promising, but many more are needed to generate a body of evidence on 
the relative time sensitivity of these indicators.  
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INDICATORS OF GENDER GAPS IN RESOURCE USE, CONTROL, AND 
OWNERSHIP 
In this section, we recommend indicators for tracking gender gaps in the use or control 
of the following types of resources: land and livestock, water and forest common property 
resources, financial assets, labor, and “participation in collective action.” The recommended 
indicators are summarized in Boxes 1‒7 at the beginning of each section, followed by 
discussion of the rationale for each. All of these indicators are based upon population (rather 
than group) sampling methods. 
All of these indicators were identified from an extensive literature review of small- and 
large-scale empirical studies, narrowed down by the application of key conceptual and 
measurement criteria as listed in Box 1. All the indicators satisfy the following three conceptual 
criteria from Box 1: they are based on the distinction between use and control rights developed 
above, they incorporate de facto joint as well as individual rights, and they are disaggregated by 
sex of the respondent rather than of the household head. In addition, all the indicators satisfy 
two measurement criteria from Box 1: they are all quantitative measures that are capable of 
being collected at multiple points of time. Table 1 in Appendix 2 presents the complete list of 
recommended indicators that meet all five criteria, along with quantitative formulae for 
calculating them from raw data. These formulae also incorporate the above-mentioned criteria. 
Table 1, Appendix 2 also provides a summary of two important findings from the 
literature review discussed in detail below. First, the table notes any concerns expressed in the 
literature about the empirical validity of the link between the indicator and gender equality. For 
example, indicators based on group membership raise questions about the extent to which 
membership translates into influence that has a bearing on gender equality. Second, the table 
notes whether the recommended indicator has been used in a large-scale study and has 
therefore been tested. Although all of these indicators have been used in published research, 
most are found in small-scale studies that test the indicator in local contexts. Few indicators 
have been tested in large-scale national or regional studies.  
Our indicators do vary in the degree to which they satisfy the remaining five criteria listed 
in Box 1. Only a few are based on measured value, rather than quantity, of resources. These 
are self-evident from the description and formulae provided. The indicators also vary in their 
degree of resource intensity, replicability, and time sensitivity. Table 2 in Appendix 2 evaluates 
the indicators on each of these three additional measurement criteria. We hope that this 
evaluation will help researchers develop their own subgroups of indicators based on the goals of 
their study/project.  
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Dashboard of indicators 
Our target audience for recommendations is composed of researchers and development 
practitioners involved in designing or validating agricultural innovations who need to monitor the 
effect of specific changes they are introducing into an agricultural production process. These 
indicators are relevant primarily for users whose main objective is not the study of gender 
relations but who need evaluations of the effect of specific innovations on gender equality. With 
this application in mind, the paper proposes a “dashboard” of indicators that can provide 
feedback in the short term to ensure that innovators are alerted if gender gaps seem to worsen.   
The dashboard of indicators presented in Table 5 is a subset selected from the full menu 
in Tables 3 and 4 on the basis of (a) sensitivity to change in the short run and (b) data already in 
existence or, if not, that can be collected by adding questions to existing surveys. The 
dashboard is intended to make it easy for innovators to re-evaluate the design and 
implementation of an intervention in an agricultural production process that is in progress and 
while there is still time to self-correct before final impacts can be measured or even achieved.  
This classification shows that, even when we aim to provide a subset of indicators that 
can be easily used for monitoring changes in gender gaps, there is no quick way to go about 
this. Table 5 highlights that no data are already available in existing large-scale studies for time-
sensitive indicators related to crucial gender gaps in land and livestock. There are ongoing 
efforts to add these to existing international surveys, but at this point they require primary data 
collection.   





Table 5. Dashboard of time-sensitive indicators for which there is an existing data 
collection instrument 
 Data already 
available 











Land    
The average sale value of the land owned by women 
compared with that owned by men,  
No GAGP Yes 
    
Proportions of women and men participating in 
decisions about the agricultural use of land 
No FAO, GAGP, 
WEAI 
Yes 
Livestock    
Proportions of women and men who own livestock 
(preferably by livestock type, for example: poultry, 
sheep and goats, cattle) 
No WEAI, GAGP  Yes 
Livestock: proportions of women and men participating 
in decisions about sale or slaughter of livestock 
No WEAI Yes 
Water and forest    
Proportions of women and men able to access  
water/firewood/fodder/fish to the desired degree 





Number of hours (per week, per person) for women 
and for men in the household, spent on collecting 







Finance    
Proportions of women and  men who saved money in 
the last 12 months through a formal or informal 
institution (i.e., not "under the pillow") 
FINDEX FINDEX Yes 
Proportions  of women and men who received a loan 
in the last 12 months from a formal or informal 
institution 
FINDEX FINDEX Yes 
Labor    
Female   labor force participation rate and male rate in 






Female  paid labor force participation rate and male 






Average hours of leisure for women and for men or 
proportions  of women and men who report 





Income    
Proportions of women and men who participate  in 
decisions to purchase daily goods 
DHS Yes Yes 
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Literature Review and Discussion of Recommended Indicators 
Resource type: land and livestock 
As the most significant immovable asset that households in agricultural regions own, 
land has both material and symbolic importance, connecting landholders to a source of 
livelihood as well as to their lineage and culture. There is now a small but significant body of 
literature that addresses gendered patterns in ownership and, to a lesser extent, control over 
land. The relatively extensive literature on ownership of land in particular means that we include 
a separate section on indicators of ownership in the case of this resource.  
Little work exists on what we term “use rights” (entry and withdrawal rights) in land. 
However, indicators of labor use, including those based on time-use studies, can give us a good 
sense of the extent to which women and men are physically accessing land and livestock and 
withdrawing output. We turn to these indicators of labor use later in the paper. Here, we add 
some indicators of decision-making about the output from the resource, an important aspect of 
withdrawal rights not revealed by patterns of labor use. 
  Access to land may be a requirement for participation in agricultural technology 
interventions. Such interventions have a direct impact on the value of land, which is often the 
most valuable asset rural households own. There is thus a very high likelihood that a gender-
blind implementation of agricultural programs may serve to further widen intra-household wealth 
inequalities between men and women. The collection of data on the intra-household distribution 
of land must therefore be a part of any effort to track the gendered impact of an agricultural 
intervention.  
In areas of water and land scarcity and/or inequality, livestock take on special 
importance as household assets that generate income, enhance food security, and serve as 
insurance in case of an income shock (Peterman et al 2014). Women are often responsible for 
the maintenance of livestock, particularly those housed close to the homestead such as poultry 
and vulnerable animals (such as those that are sick or injured), along with the processing of 
dairy products (FAO 2010). However, women are less likely than men to own livestock, 
particularly larger, more valuable livestock.  
Agricultural R&D agencies are extensively involved in livestock breeding innovations in 
part because ownership of livestock is a way to raise income and improve nutritional outcomes 
for poor, landless households in arid regions (Njuki and Sanginga 2013). Indeed, given the 
entrenched patterns of land inheritance, livestock may actually prove to be easier for women to 
own and control than land (FAO 2010).   





Box 2. Recommended indicators for gender gaps related to ownership, use, and control 
over land and livestock 
 
Indicators of ownership: 
 
Land:  
 The proportion of women and the proportion of men who own land (solely or jointly, self-reported) 
 The average area of land owned by women, same indicator for men  
 The average potential sale value of the land owned by women, same indicator for men 
Livestock: 
 The proportion of women who own livestock, same indicator for men 
 The average Total Livestock Units owned by women, same indicator for men 
 The average potential sale value of livestock owned by women, same indicator for men 
 
Indicators of use rights: 
 
Land: 
 The proportion of women who participate (solely or jointly) in decisions about the use of crops 
(sale versus own consumption), same indicator for men  
Livestock 
 The proportion of women who participate (solely or jointly) in decisions about the use of daily 
livestock produce (such as milk, eggs), same indicator for men 
 The proportion of women who participate (solely or jointly) in decisions about the use of meat 
(when livestock are slaughtered), same indicator for men 
 
Indicators of control rights: 
 
Land:  
 The proportion of women participating (solely or jointly) in decisions about the “agricultural use of 
land”, same indicator for men 
 The proportion of women participating (solely or jointly) in decisions about 
 - crop choice 
 - choice of inputs 
 - timing of cropping            
 - sale or transfer of land 
            (for at least one crop or plot if there are multiple crops or plots). 
 
Same indicator for men 
 
Livestock:  
 The proportion of women participating (solely or jointly) in decisions about sale, transfer, or 
slaughter of livestock, same indicator for men 
 
 
Indicators of ownership of land  
Across the world, a growing body of literature shows that women are less likely than 
male members of their households to own land and even less likely to own high-quality land 
(Deere and Doss 2006). The feminist literature on gender and land rights, pioneered by the 




work of Agarwal (1994) and Deere (Deere and León 2001), suggested that women’s ability to 
own land may improve their bargaining power within the household while also expanding their 
livelihood opportunities more generally. A number of recent studies have attempted to test this 
hypothesis using small data samples.  
Doss et al (2015) lay out some of the widely used indicators of gender asset gaps in land 
ownership for Africa. The most common measure reported in their review of studies on women 
and land ownership in Africa is the proportion of women/men who self-report owning land jointly 
or individually. Reviews of studies of gender and land rights for Asia and Latin America also 
show that this is the most common indicator used (Kieran et al 2015, Deere et al 2012). 
 These reviews all note the paucity of nationally representative data on even this 
“incidence” indicator. Although the DHS does ask about the incidence of land ownership, it does 
so for only one woman of reproductive age per household. The LSMS provides a more 
complete listing of both whether and how much land is owned by each household member.   
Doss et al (2015) also point out that, in most of the studies they reviewed, the term 
ownership was used when the survey actually asked about the landholder/manager. As 
discussed below, we treat land management as an aspect of control rights and urge greater 
attention to the difference between these terms. Deere et al (2012) point out other discrepancies 
in the country-level surveys in Latin America that make generalization across countries difficult. 
For example, in some countries, questions were asked only about the ownership of titled land, 
which is a subset of all owned land. Furthermore, only in two countries were respondents asked 
about joint ownership of land, which is often the most common form of land ownership for 
women.  
Some recent studies do pay careful attention to these issues. Deere et al (2013) use 
incidence measures to describe the extent of the gender asset gap in Ecuador, Ghana, and 
Karnataka (India), as do the ICRW GLAS studies in South Africa (Jacobs et al 2011) and 
Uganda (Kes et al 2011). The ICRW studies find that women are more likely to state that they 
own land jointly rather than solely and furthermore that gender asset gaps are greater within 
dual-headed households than between female-headed and male-headed households. Another 
significant finding is that the woman’s familial situation is extremely important, with age and 
relationship to the head affecting the likelihood of owning land. For example, in the South 
African sample, women who were married to the household head were better off in terms of 
land ownership than wives or partners of other men in the household. The authors thus call for 
more gender-disaggregated data collection on land ownership within dual-headed households. 
Overall, whether a woman owns land (solely as well as jointly) appears to affect the well-
being of the women and their households. Savath et al (2014) find that higher proportions of 
female ownership of land are associated with more food-secure livelihood combinations being 
pursued by households in Odisha, India. Panda and Agarwal (2005) find that female ownership 




of land or a home significantly reduces the likelihood that the woman experiences domestic 
violence. In a study based on primary data from the Philippines, Estudillo et al (2001) show that 
the mother’s ownership of land has a positive effect on the amount of schooling daughters (as 
compared with sons) receive as well as on the amount of land bequeathed to daughters (as 
compared with sons). Allendorf (2007) uses DHS data on whether a woman owns land solely or 
jointly to show that women’s ownership of land has a positive statistically significant effect on 
their ability to participate in joint decision-making about their own mobility and healthcare as well 
as household expenditure.6 Menon et al (2013) show for Vietnam that women’s sole ownership 
of land has beneficial effects on household poverty, household expenditure, and the self-
employment of women, while women’s joint ownership has a statistically significant impact only 
on the former. The ability to differentiate between sole and joint ownership can thus be 
insightful.  
Another body of literature tests the impact of female land ownership on farm productivity. 
Female land ownership is found to decrease productivity in the aggregate (Dimova and Gang 
2013) but studies that control for lower female access to complementary labor and capital inputs 
find that this productivity gap is eliminated or shrinks substantially (Udry et al 1995, Peterman et 
al 2014, de Brauw 2015, Kilic et al 2015, Aguilar et al 2014, Oseni et al 2015).   
We therefore recommend the more widespread collection of the basic land ownership 
incidence measure described above, with the caveat that ownership may mean different things 
in different contexts. The proportion of men and women who own land meets our conceptual 
and logistical criteria and has been empirically tested in multiple contexts.  
We also recommend the collection of data on the value of land owned by women and by 
men. This indicator has limitations in that it is conditional upon land ownership as well as upon 
the existence of a robust measure of monetary value. Nevertheless, the likelihood that such an 
indicator may be more sensitive to changes in technology in the short to medium run makes it a 
potentially useful indicator.  
Doss at al (2015) note that data on the value or even the area of land owned were rarely 
collected in the studies they reviewed, although the LSMS-ISA does collect some such data. At 
present, the research that is emerging from the Gender Asset Gap Project (GAGP) for Ecuador, 
Ghana, and Karnataka appears to be the most systematic attempt to construct and analyze a 
sex-disaggregated measure of land value (Deere et al 2013, Swaminathan et al 2012, Doss et 
al 2013). The surveys administered as part of the GAGP collected information on the size of 
land owned by each member of the principal couple as well as two different valuation measures: 
rental value and current sale value. Valuation questions raised issues of the inaccuracies of 
                                               
6 She also finds that women’s land ownership increased child nutrition outcomes, most likely as a result of what she 
assumes to be the “larger income and resources that women’s land rights provide” (Allendorf 2007, 10). Notably, this 
last assumption is not necessarily borne out in the literature below on productivity. 




respondents, of disagreements among respondents, and missing values where rental or sale 
markets did not exist. Nevertheless, the authors conclude that valuation data play a significant 
role in any study of gender and asset inequality since asset wealth gaps may not always 
correspond to asset incidence gaps. The authors also show that the current sale value of land 
may be the most generalizable measure of land value given the complexity and variation in 
rental contract structures in different regions and countries. As noted earlier, agricultural 
interventions are much more likely to directly affect wealth gaps than incidence gaps in the short 
to medium term and thus such data, although resource intensive to collect, are likely to be much 
more useful than incidence data alone.  
 
Indicators of ownership of livestock 
  Significant gender gaps exist in livestock ownership, with women less likely to own 
larger livestock, in part because of a lack of capital (Taj et al 2012, Ayoade et al 2009, Oladele 
and Monkhei 2008). Poultry appear to be the most common form of livestock owned by women, 
with goats and sheep less frequently reported as being owned by women (Njuki and Mburu 
2013, Kabeer and Tran 2000). There is some evidence that the increased involvement of rural 
men in nonagricultural activities has increased the role women play in small-scale livestock 
production (Farinde and Ajayi 2005). On the other hand, as with other assets, increases in the 
value of livestock or livestock products and shifts toward large-scale production often mean that 
women lose control over the asset (FAO 2010). Agricultural interventions can more easily shift 
the incidence of livestock ownership than of land ownership Quisumbing and Kumar 2011) so 
incidence indicators of livestock ownership are likely to be more sensitive than indicators of land 
ownership. 
 The simplest indicator we recommend is thus the gendered incidence of livestock 
ownership (sole and joint), without specifying the kind of livestock owned. This is the approach 
taken by the WEAI.  However, although more resource intensive, data by type of livestock can 
be more revealing of gender gaps. We thus recommend a second indicator that aggregates 
across ownership of various kinds of livestock using the FAO’s system of Total Livestock Units 
(TLU) (Njuki et al 2013).  
In terms of how the data are collected, Njuki and Mburu (2013) ask both members of the 
principal couple in dual-headed household to list the type and quantity of livestock that they own 
solely or jointly. Since we recommend interviewing one member of a household, we follow the 
GAGP in suggesting that the interviewee be asked to construct a household-level inventory of 
all assets, including all livestock, and then be asked the identity of the owner or owners of each 
(Doss et al 2013).  




The current market value of livestock could be used to generate wealth gaps in livestock 
(Quisumbing and Kumar 2011). Njuki and Mburu (2013) use this approach and find that, 
although a small proportion of women own cattle, the high value of cattle means that cattle 
ownership comprises the most significant proportion of the value of women’s livestock.  
 
Indicators of use rights over land and livestock 
As discussed earlier, the female (or male) labor force participation rate in agriculture, an 
indicator of labor use, could be a useful indicator of access to over land and livestock. We 
elaborate further on this as a possible indicator later in the paper. Insofar as withdrawal rights 
are an important aspect of use rights, the key question is whether women and men have 
decision-making rights over the output withdrawn from land and livestock. Although this is a 
question that the literature often folds into the discussion of control rights, we separate out entry 
and withdrawal indicators for the sake of conceptual clarity.  
Thus, our list of recommended indicators includes the proportion of women who report 
sole or joint participation in decision-making about the use of land for crops (sale or own-use). In 
the case of livestock, we distinguish between daily output from livestock (milk, eggs), which 
women do appear to have more say in, as opposed to meat from the slaughter of livestock, 
which women appear to have less control over (FAO 2010).   
 
Indicators of control rights over land and livestock 
In this paper, control over land and livestock is understood to refer to participation in the 
management of the asset and decision-making about the use and distribution of output.  In a 
somewhat unusual situation, gender-disaggregated data for at least one measure of land 
management – the principal landholder or agricultural decision-maker – are more likely to be 
available at the nationally representative level than a measure of land ownership. The FAO 
gender and land rights database has aggregated data on the share of landholders who are 
women from national agricultural censuses for 84 countries.  
The FAO notes that this measure is flawed in that multiple plots are aggregated under a 
single holding, thus masking the gendered distribution of farming responsibilities at the plot 
level. Furthermore, the censuses report a single farm holder, often corresponding to the male 
household head, although women may be involved in many significant aspects of farm 
management. The World program for the Census of Agriculture (WCA) has recognized this 
problem and, as of 2010, has modified its definition to include a “joint holder” (FAO 2005). It is 
not clear to what extent these new guidelines are being followed by member countries.  




While the WCA thus provides some limited and imperfect data, to be consistent with our 
conceptual criteria, we recommend a related but slightly different indicator: the share of women 
who report being the primary decision-maker (solely as well as jointly) with respect to 
agricultural use of land. Thus, while using a similar definition of landholder, our measure has a 
different denominator (all women) from that of the WCA database (denominator, all 
landholders). 
De Brauw et al (2008) create an indicator of managerial control for land in China, which 
also includes a more specific question on control over the income generated by the farm and/or 
over processes such as marketing that generate most of the income. Here, we distinguish 
between control over land and control over income, thus separating these two categories. 
Understanding decision-making about land, as separate from control over income, will aid the 
design of more effective and gender-equitable agricultural interventions.  
Of course, the WCA definition is quite broad, as “management control” over the 
agricultural holding can incorporate several different issues. The LSMS creates three categories 
of agricultural decision-making: decisions about (a) crop choice, (b) input use, and (c) the timing 
of cropping. Although some LSMS ask questions about decision-making for each crop and each 
subactivity within these three categories, this broader three-part frame may be one that is 
reasonably concise but could nevertheless capture some more subtle changes in female and 
male management rights. We thus recommend a second, more nuanced, indicator of control 
over land that is disaggregated into these three categories, as well as a fourth important 
category of decisions about the sale/transfer of land. 
Dimova and Gang (2013) use crop-disaggregated LSMS data for Malawi and find that 
female land ownership increases the likelihood that women participate in decisions about cash-
cropping, which is associated with larger streams of income in Malawi. de Brauw (2015) uses 
simply the ability to choose the crop (solely or jointly) as a measure of female management 
rights over agricultural land. He uses plot- and crop-level data based on a small sample 
household survey in northern Mozambique to show that women make these decisions in only 
70% of the cases in which they own the land and that the primary determinant of women’s 
ability to make these decisions is an indicator that the man was involved in off-farm work. Thus, 
effective management of land by women, he argues, is enhanced but not guaranteed by female 
ownership of land. Although his results differ from those of Dimova and Gang (2013), in both 
cases sex-disaggregated data on decision-making in agricultural production turn out to be 
useful.  
We follow a similar format for livestock, asking about participation in decision-making 
about the sale, transfer, or slaughter of the livestock as an indicator of “control” over the 
resource (Njuki and Mburu 2013).  




Resource type: water and forest common pool resources 
Common pool resources (CPRs) are a vital source of food, fodder, fuel, firewood, and 
water for agricultural households, particularly for poorer and landless ones (Beck and Nesmith 
2001). Understanding the full income impacts of any policy or technology change in rural 
communities thus requires an understanding of its impacts on the use and control of common 
pool resources. A growing body of research is calling attention to the gendering of CPR use and 
arguing that increasing women’s ability to access and control the use of CPRs is not only central 
to ensuring gender equality in these communities, but can also improve the conservation and 
management of such resources (Agarwal 2010a, Khosla and Pearl 2003).  
To the extent that these are common pool resources, an understanding of who controls 
the use of these resources requires identifying the institutions of CPR management at the 
community level in each context and developing indicators that appropriately address the extent 
to which women and men are able to influence those decisions. The increased advocacy and 
prevalence of user groups to manage common pool resources means that recent studies of 
gendered access to common property resources investigate the extent to which the “descriptive 
representation of women in (user) groups can lead to substantive representation” (Meinzen-Dick 
and Zwarteveen 2001). This raises methodological issues for us, as our primary goal is to 
recommend indicators that can be developed using population sampling methods such as those 
employed by national household surveys, the LSMS, the WEAI, and so on. As we see in 
Appendix 1, the indicators of control that are used in the CPR literature are based on the 
sampling of groups. We instead propose versions of these indicators based on population 
samples. 
This section focuses in particular on access to forest and water resources. Forest 
resources provide firewood and fodder as well as access to fruits, herbs, and vegetables that 
grow in the wild, whose collection is the responsibility of women and girls in most societies. 
These forest products serve as key inputs into the production of food, again the responsibility of 
women worldwide. Any degradation in the quantity or quality of these resources thus affects 
women’s time and income poverty.   
 Access to water is equally central to a host of tasks that are defined as the responsibility 
of women, within and outside the household (Zwarteveen 1997, Khosla and Pearl 2003). Here, 
too, water-use technologies developed primarily for agriculture (for example, large-scale 
irrigation projects that involve the diversion and consolidation of water bodies or tube wells that 
reduce the groundwater available for drinking wells) can negatively affect women’s ability to 
access and use water for their needs (Crow and Sultana 2002). Sex-disaggregated indicators 
that capture changes in women’s/men’s ability to access water are thus crucial to evaluating the 
full impact of such projects on well-being.  




The impact of technological innovations on common pool resources is likely to be 
significant. Changes in seed type and increases in the value of crops, for example, can change 
patterns of land and water use and thus claims upon water and forest lands. As agricultural land 
has expanded, land once defined as common use has become increasingly privatized or 
controlled by the state, thus affecting women’s ability to gather firewood and water and thus 
their time and income poverty (Beck and Nesmith 2001). 
Given the extent to which poor households depend on common pool resources for fuel, 
food, and water needs and the extent to which women use these CPRs, any analysis of the 
impact of agricultural interventions must include their impact on common property resources.  
In seeking to identify such indicators, our work overlaps with that of the World Water 
Assessment Program (WWAP), which is in the process of developing a set of international 
indicators for gendered access to water (WWAP 2014). To enable coordination between these 
efforts, we suggest employing some of those indicators for other common property resources as 
well.  
Box 3. Recommended indicators for gender gaps related to use and control over water 
and forest common pool resources 
 
Indicators of use 
 The proportion of women able to access water/firewood/fodder to the desired degree, same 
indicator for men 
 Average number of hours (per week, per woman, per man in the household) spent in collecting 
water, firewood and fodder 
 
Indicators of control over decision-making 
 The proportion of women and men who are members of a water or forest user group 
 The proportion of women and men who report attending water or forest user group meetings 
(conditional upon group membership)  
 The proportion of women and men who report speaking at meetings of the forest/water user 
group (conditional upon group membership) 
 
 
Indicators of use rights over forests and water 
Forest resources 
Women’s use of forest resources differs from men’s use in terms of the kinds of forest 
products they are likely to access. Women are more likely to access berries, fruits, fodder, and 
firewood and men are more likely to access timber (Agarwal 1997, Mwangi and Mai 2011). This 
difference also means a difference in the timing of use. Women’s needs, while causing less 
large-scale damage to the forest, are ongoing throughout the year. Male logging of timber, on 
the other hand, can be concentrated in time, occurring a few times in a year. Attempts to 
manage forest resources by restricting use to certain periods of time can thus have disparate 
impacts on men and women, making it harder for women to use forest resources than for men. 




 The most comprehensive work on gender and forest use and conservation is Bina 
Agarwal’s study of 135 forest user groups in India and Nepal, compiled in the book Gender and 
Green Governance (2010a). As part of the study, Agarwal asks respondents whether they 
experience a shortage of firewood, fodder, timber, fish, and wild fruits and vegetables.  
A modified indicator, which we recommend, would be the proportion of women/men who 
are able to access forest resources to the extent necessary. If asked of both men and women, 
this would be a subjective indicator of gendered gaps in access to these resources. Answers to 
these questions would of course vary by class, caste, and race within the same 
geographic/ecological region, so surveyors would have to be careful about their sampling frame. 
 A more objective but also more resource-intensive indicator would be the average 
amount of time spent per week per woman in the household to collect the desired amount of 
each resource versus the average amount of time spent per week per man in the household. 
We recommend this indicator despite its resource intensity because, as discussed later, time-
use studies are essential to understanding time poverty. Furthermore, the collection of time-use 
data by the WEAI and some national survey agencies may imply that such an indicator will 
become easier to construct in the future.  
 
Water resources   
In order to capture actual use, the WWAP review also suggests an indicator on “the 
ability to access water to the desired degree.” This would be an extremely important question to 
ask women and men in households to evaluate the “full income” impact of agricultural 
interventions. As in the case of forest resources, a time-use module would provide a more 
objective answer to this question by helping understand gendered differences in the average 
hours spent to access water and fuel.  
 
Indicators of control rights over forests and water 
 As we shall see, the few studies that attempt to look at gendered control over forests 
and water rely on sampling and observation of user groups (Mwangi and Mai 2011). Our goal, 
on the other hand, is to find indicators that can be based on national household surveys that 
sample individuals. What we recommend is therefore a question asking women and men if they 
are members of forest or water user groups. The weakness of this indicator is that mere 
membership in the user group does not translate into effective control over resource 
management outcomes (Nightingale 2002). To attempt to get at more substantive participation, 




we also recommend indicators based on asking women and men if they attend forest and user 
group meetings, as well as if they have spoken at forest and user group meetings.7  
  Indicators based on membership, attendance, and voice in user groups are clearly 
limited in terms of their replicability across context given that forested areas are likely to have 
more forest user groups than the plains, and that the prevalence of user groups of any kind is 
likely to vary significantly depending upon the local political economy. These indicators are 
merely a first step toward measuring gendered gaps in common pool resources and we urge 
further research into these issues. 
Resource type: financial assets 
A very important consequence of women’s lack of property rights and limited 
participation in paid work is an inability to acquire and accumulate financial assets, including 
checking and savings accounts in banks and other financial institutions as well as access to 
credit and insurance instruments that depend on proof of repayment via income streams or 
collateral, both of which women lack.  
Although women’s exclusion from large, formal financial institutions is well documented, 
so is the existence of women-only “chit funds,” ROSCAs, or savings groups across the world, 
some of which are now regulated by the government and thus “formalized” (Collins et al 2009). 
The existence of such institutions globally suggests a less visible women’s history of 
engagement and comfort with financial transactions and an understanding of the importance of 
access to savings and credit. Indeed, in some countries, women’s involvement in informal 
financial institutions is greater than men’s (Johnson and Nino-Zarazua 2011, Demigurc-Kunt 
and Klapper 2013). However, although being more flexible and clearly more inclusive of the 
poor, smaller microfinance institutions often provide relatively more expensive credit/lower 
returns on savings, thus limiting members’ ability to use financial instruments to increase 
savings, investment, and household income (Claessens 2006). Dupas and Robinson (2009) find 
that women small entrepreneurs in Kenya extensively used non-interest-bearing savings 
accounts even though they had high withdrawal fees (provided to them in a randomized control 
trial), indicating negative rates of return on their informal savings instruments and high latent 
demand for access to formal bank accounts. 
Despite an expansion of microfinance agencies targeting women, women’s access to 
savings and credit remains extremely limited in rural, developing-world contexts (Mayoux and 
Hartl 2009). Microfinance groups have not been able to build the long-lasting linkages to larger 
financial institutions necessary to scale up their access to funds and grow independently of 
                                               
7 These mirror questions asked of group members by Agarwal in her 2010 study, as well as questions that the 
WWAP is hoping to collect data on for water user group members. 
 




nongovernment and aid organizations (Cull et al 2009). Meanwhile, commercial financial 
institutions (FIs), both public and private, seem to act in ways that further reinforce legal and 
social biases against women rather than undermining them (Demigurc-Kunt et al 2013). 
The long-term success of agricultural interventions rests on sustainable access to credit, 
which, if gendered, inevitably results in gendered patterns of participation in the agricultural 
interventions. This can generate a vicious circle in which participation in innovation programs 
increases assets and income in a gender unequal way, thus further reducing the likelihood of 
female participation in future programs. One important early indicator of gendered impact is thus 
likely to show up in women’s and men’s patterns of savings and credit.  
 The recent publication of the 2011 and 2014 Findex surveys means that sex-
disaggregated data on the use of financial assets are now available across a three-year period 
nationally for 148 countries. When possible, we therefore recommend indicators that the Findex 
collects to minimize the resource intensity of data collection. Indeed, in comparison to the 
paucity of gendered data on other kinds of resources, this survey provides us with a wealth of 
internationally comparable sex-disaggregated data on basic measures of financial use. We 
hope that funding for the Findex survey will remain robust and that the survey will continue to 
serve as an example of the kind of gendered data collection that we seek. It should be noted 
that the Findex survey assumes that registered microfinance organizations are formal financial 
institutions. In some countries, however, a significant proportion of microfinance organizations 
may not be formal in this sense (Grown et al 2015). 




 The proportion of women banked (individually or jointly) at a formal sector institution, same 
indicator for men 
 The proportion of women who are members of a microfinance/ROSCA group, same indicator 
for men 
 The average duration for which women have participated in a group-based formal/informal 
financial institution, same indicator for men 
 The proportion of women who have saved money in the last 12 months through a formal or 
informal financial institution, same indicator for men 
 The proportion of women who have received a loan in the last 12 months from a formal or 
informal financial institution, same indicator for men 
 
Control  
 The proportion of women who (solely or jointly) decided how to use the loan amounts, same 
indicator for men 
 Conditional upon asset use of the loan, the proportion of women who acquired an ownership 
(solely or jointly) stake in the asset, same indicator for men 
 The proportion of women responsible for repayment of the loan (conditional upon loan receipt), 
same indicator for men 





Indicators of use rights over financial assets  
 Access to large, commercial financial institutions (FIs) remains the goal of most projects 
that seek to expand financial inclusion. Ultimately, commercial FIs provide most savers and 
borrowers with larger and cheaper loans and offer them a wide variety of vehicles for savings 
that are safer and have higher returns (Vonderlack and Schreiner 2002). As Johnson (2004) 
points out, although the lack of participation in commercial FIs could be voluntary, given the 
clear cost advantages of FI financial products and the extent to which the poor participate in 
informal institutions (Collins et al 2009), it is widely accepted that the financial exclusion of 
women and the poor in developing countries is more likely involuntary. Given that the use of 
commercial FIs begins with the opening of a checking or savings account at a bank or credit 
union, the proportion of women and men who are banked (i.e., hold a bank account in a post 
office, bank, or credit union) is widely used as an indicator of financial use (Claessens 2006).  
The Findex survey asks respondents whether they hold accounts solely and jointly in a 
bank or other type of financial institution. This is the same indicator we recommend, with the 
additional recommendation that sole and joint data be collected separately so that a 
disaggregated analysis can be performed if useful. According to Findex data, the gender gap in 
the proportion of women banked is considerably higher in developing countries, and in rural 
areas. The gender gap in the proportion of men and women banked ranges from 6 to 9 
percentage points across the sample. Although the “lack of money to open an account” was the 
most common reason for being unbanked in the sample as a whole, the second most common 
reason that women provided was that a “family member already has an account” (Demigurc-
Kunt and Klapper 2013).   
As far as access to credit goes, the Findex asks whether the respondent has borrowed 
money “from any source in the past year” and then disaggregates by kind of source (bank, 
informal lender, family, etc.) and purpose of the loan. Here, we recommend the question on 
borrowing in the last year from formal and informal institutions (as opposed to family) as a first 
look at gendered access to credit. The Findex includes a similarly structured measure of 
savings: whether the respondent saved any money in the last 12 months and the savings 
vehicle used. We recommend a savings measure that focuses on savings through formal and 
informal institutions (as opposed to money saved “under the pillow”). 
The Gender Asset Gap Project recently published an analysis of its data on borrowing 
(Grown et al 2015). This is a richer data set in that information on both members of the principal 
couple in a household is available and this includes information on the purpose of the loan. The 
authors find that women have less debt for asset accumulation than men, and that the mean 
value of asset debt held by women is lower. They also find that ownership of assets is positively 




correlated with taking out asset loans, for both men and women. Thus, inequalities in asset 
ownership tend to perpetuate themselves.     
The receipt of a loan on its own is, however, an ambiguous measure of well-being as it 
could indicate the existence of debt spiral and so may require information on the purpose and 
source of the loan (Mayoux and Hartl 2009). Grown et al (2015) find, for example, that wealthier 
households are more likely to hold asset debt, which leads to greater wealth in the future, while 
poorer households hold expense debt, more likely a sign of a debt spiral. Since Findex data on 
the purpose of the loan are available, researchers may be able to investigate the gendered use 
of different kinds of credit.  
The size of savings accumulated by women and men and the size of loans received by 
each are also possible indicators of use. These last two indicators are somewhat more difficult 
to collect and, as with all wealth data, more prone to errors and/or disagreements among the 
members of the household. Within the Findex, questions on the amount of money saved or in 
checking accounts are conspicuous by their absence because of the sensitivity of such 
questions. However, Grown et al (2015) do collect and analyze these data. Some national 
household surveys such as the Indian NSS do collect data on quantity and source of loans at 
the household level and perhaps need to be urged to ask in whose name the loan was taken 
out. We mark this as a possibility for the future given our belief that wealth indicators can be 
more sensitive than incidence indicators.  
We also flag, without recommending, another indicator used in the U.S. Survey of 
Consumer Finance (SCF) but not in the Findex: the proportion of women or men who report 
being denied a loan in the last five years. This may be helpful in understanding the extent to 
which women are being denied credit at a higher rate. However, those who are likely to be 
denied are also less likely to ask for a loan, making us hesitant to recommend this indicator. 
There is a much larger literature on gendered access to group-based financial 
institutions. Particularly among rural women, participation in a microfinance group/organization 
is used as an indicator of access to credit in several studies (Johnson 2004, Johnson and Nino-
Zarazua 2011). Other studies use the gender of a microloan recipient (as opposed to just 
membership in a microfinance group) as an indicator of an increase in financial access (Pitt and 
Khandker 1998, Hashemi et al 1996, Holvoet 2005). Although the Findex does not ask this 
question, we recommend a survey question asking women and men whether they are members 
of a ROSCA (rotating savings and credit association)/microcredit group. 
Merely holding an account or being a member of a chit fund does not, however, 
necessarily translate into higher savings and credit activity. An alternative indicator on the 
duration of membership in a microfinance/informal financial institution has been used to add 
more nuance to an indicator of use. Garikipati (2008) uses a categorical variable with 0 = not a 
member, 1 = member for three years or less, 2 = member for between 3 and 6 years, and 4 = 




member for more than 6 years. Pitt et al (2006) find that such a duration indicator is highly 
correlated with loan size. Where group participation is of interest, we suggest that this may thus 
be a richer indicator of use for membership-based financial institutions.  
Indicators of control rights over financial assets 
 Although participation in financial institutions can increase women’s ability to use credit 
and savings vehicles, the question of whether they effectively control the allocation of these 
funds within the household and thus the distribution of benefits remains in doubt. Some studies 
suggest that group membership can be especially important in translating participation in 
microfinance into effective control by women (Bali Swain and Wallentin 2007, Holvoet 2005). 
The literature also suggests that, when female access to financial assets does not result in 
increased female ownership of productive assets and increased female streams of income, 
female-male empowerment gaps can actually worsen (Mayoux and Hartl 2009, Garikipati 2008).  
 The ongoing debate over this issue has, however, brought about several possible ways 
of measuring the extent of control over credit. In one of the earliest systematic studies of this 
issue, Goetz and Sengupta (1996) use a dual indicator that combines knowledge about the use 
of the loan with involvement (through the contribution of labor) in the activities that the loan was 
used to finance. They combine these two variables to develop a five-point index of “managerial 
control” over the loan. Kabeer (2001), however, points out that this conflates the decision about 
how to use the loan with the actual implementation of that decision. Given the possible 
differences between male and female financial priorities, she argues for clearly separating out 
the former.  
Several studies ask respondents who decided how to use the loan, with answers 
classified along a range from only or mostly the respondent to only or mostly another family 
member. In the case of most studies, this other member is the spouse. Thus, a question about 
“who decides how to use the loan/savings amount” as well as “who was responsible for 
repayment of any loan” would appear to be reasonably easy to integrate into a household 
survey while also fitting the conceptual need for a sex-disaggregated measure that can be 
tracked over time. When a loan is taken out to purchase an asset, we recommend asking who 
owns this asset (Mayoux and Hartl 2009, Garikipati 2008). 
 An extensive body of literature attempts to examine the gendered impact of financial 
assets on outcome variables, including decision-making. Studies measure a range of outcome 
variables such as the proportion of household income generated by the woman versus her 
spouse (Garikipati 2008), the number of hours of employment of the woman versus her spouse, 
and questions about the extent to which the woman participates in decision-making about 
aspects of household expenditures (Holvoet 2005, Garikipati 2008, Ashraf et al 2010, Banerjee 
et al 2015). Studies also look at non-sex-disaggregated household metrics such as expenditure 




on certain durable goods believed to be female-preferred (Ashraf et al 2010) and medical 
expenditure or the years of education of children (Pitt et al 2006, Pitt and Khandker 1998) or 
nutritional outcomes for children (Hazarika and Guha-Khasnobis 2008), based on the 
assumption that these outcome variables correlate with women’s increased decision-making. 
Even if in almost all these cases the data are not nationally representative, this body of literature 
suggests that sex-disaggregated data on use and control of financial assets can be a useful 
signal of gender gaps in well-being more generally.
Resource type: labor 
 Labor is an extremely critical input into agricultural production, a vital source of livelihood 
for asset-poor households, and an important determinant of intra-household bargaining power. 
This section analyzes key indicators of the impact of agricultural interventions on gender gaps 
with respect to labor. Here, too, we use the framework of use and control to distinguish between 
the actual allocation of women’s time and the extent to which women believe they have a say in 
that allocation. 
 
Indicators of use of labor 
 The traditional metric of labor force participation continues to be extensively used and 
widely published in UN, World Bank, and other international studies of gender and the economy. 
Several studies link female labor force participation rates to greater participation in household 
decision-making as well as improved education and health outcomes for women and children. In 
addition, the UN and World Bank continue to treat higher female labor force participation as a 
metric of increased female empowerment (World Bank 2012, UN Women 2010).  
It is important to note that the UN System of National Accounts (SNA) definition of labor 
includes self-employment and paid and unpaid work in family enterprises in both informal and 
formal settings, but excludes unpaid domestic work. Activities are within the economic 
production boundary defined by the SNA if they comprise (a) production of goods or services 
supplied, or intended to be supplied, to units other than their producers, including the production 
of goods and services used up in the process of producing such goods or services (intermediate 
consumption); (b) production of all goods retained by their producers for their own final use 
(own-account production of goods); (c) production of housing services by owner-occupiers; and 
(d) production of domestic and personal services produced by paid domestic staff (UN 2008). 
National data on labor force participation currently cover only SNA work. Here, we therefore 
distinguish between these two kinds of work by using the terms SNA and non-SNA work.  
The debate over the U-shape in the relationship between female labor force participation 
(SNA work) and GDP/capita suggests that increases in female labor force participation do not 




always correspond to improvements in household income such as those that might be expected 
from agricultural innovations (Cagatay and Ozler 1995, Klasen 1999). Increased participation in 
heavy farm work is not in itself desirable, as shown by more localized studies that find that 
women report greater satisfaction when they withdraw from the labor force – particularly when 
the work itself is arduous labor in inadequate working conditions (Agarwal 1994, Johnson et al 
2015). The International Labour Organization (ILO) is currently developing a global indicator of 
decent work to address these limitations of the current definition of the labor force participation 
rate. Consequently, we recommend time-use studies of leisure hours to understand whether 
increased labor force participation merely intensifies a “double burden” for women and men 
(Floro and Mieurs 2009). We return to the issue of time-use data below. 
With respect to labor force participation in agriculture, the World Development Indicators 
database reports the female/male proportion of the agricultural labor force (SNA work).8 We 
recommend use of the same indicator in order to make use of the World Development 
Indicators database and others since this indicator is also available from most country censuses 
or household surveys at the level of local administrative units. An important caveat, however, is 
that these surveys are undercounting women’s economic activity by treating at least some own-
farm agricultural work as domestic or non-SNA work (Antonopoulos and Hirway 2010). 
An indicator of a gender gap in the use of labor resources based on the female 
proportion of the wage labor force in agriculture is desirable for several reasons. First, although 
a relatively low proportion of men’s and women’s agricultural work is likely to be paid a wage in 
smallholder agriculture, for asset-poor households, paid work may provide a vital source of cash 
in a commercializing economy. Thus, participation in the agricultural wage labor force can be 
interpreted as an indicator of access to a scarce resource ‒ cash. Second, there is reason to 
expect that female participation in wage labor will be correlated with increased decision-making 
over other farm household resources based on some evidence that paid work increases 
women’s participation in decision-making in some contexts (Jejeebhoy 2002, Anderson and 
Eswaran 2009, Deere and Twyman 2012, Twyman et al 2015). Finally, sex-disaggregated data 
on individual participation are easily available in international databases.  
In many countries, the relative stagnation of agriculture and the profound urban bias of 
the state have resulted in a very deep problem of under-unemployment for men and women in 
rural areas (Jackson and Rao 2009). One important indicator of the success or failure of 
agricultural interventions would thus be a decline in the degree of under-/unemployment for men 
as well as women. To the extent that domestic non-SNA work can be a residual category for 
women, measures of unemployment are notoriously poor at picking up female unemployment in 
                                               
8 An important difference is that the denominator for the proportion of the agricultural labor force is the total size of the 
agricultural labor force, whereas, for labor force participation, the denominator is the female working-age population. 




developing countries. Thus, a direct question on self-reported under-employment may be a 
useful indicator. 
However, indicators of SNA-based work have their limitations. Apart from failing to value 
women’s domestic work, they mask possible negative effects on leisure time. Interventions that 
increase labor force participation may also decrease leisure time, thus intensifying women’s 
work burdens and doing so differently for women based on ethnicity and class status (Doss 
2001, Deshpande 2011, Johnson et al 2015). Time-use studies have thus emerged as among 
the most significant methodological additions to the development data toolkit in the last decade 
(Antonopoulos and Hirway 2010). Time-use studies are currently our best tool to measure non-
SNA work. The expansion of time-use studies has come about largely as a result of pressure 
from feminists arguing that women’s “double burden” makes them uniquely starved of leisure 
time and that both the long-standing devaluation of women’s work and the extent of multi-
tasking involved in much of women’s intra-household labor make conventional methods of 
measuring work inadequate (Esquivel et al 2008).  
Eighty-five countries have now implemented at least one national-level time-use survey 
since 1990 although this list is dominated by developed countries (Antonopoulos and Hirway 
2010, ICATUS 2012). Their experience suggests that these surveys do require well-trained 
enumerators and are likely to be time and resource intensive. Time-use studies can vary by the 
time frame tracked as well as the method used to document activities: diaries versus recall 
interviews. Although 24-hour time diaries maintained by respondents are recommended by 
ICATUS guidelines, several recent surveys, including the WEAI, have chosen to ask 
respondents to recall their use of time over the previous 24 hours. Based on recall data, the 
WEAI computes the number of hours of leisure reported by the respondents and creates an 
indicator of insufficient leisure hours if they fall below 10.5 hours (per 24-hour period).  
For tracking a gender gap in labor use, we recommend including an indicator based on 
differences in leisure time between men and women. When possible, data for this indicator 
should be obtained from a respondent survey based on recall to compute the average number 
of leisure hours for the male and female members of the principal couple in a household. 
Tracking increases or decreases in average leisure hours is likely to be more sensitive to short- 
or medium-term change than an indicator that simply asks women and men if they have 
adequate leisure time or if they are satisfied with their hours of leisure. Although subject to all of 
the problems with self-reported subjective assessments, this indicator will remind planners and 
program managers to pay attention to the risk that an agricultural innovation can inadvertently 
exacerbate problems of women’s “double-burden.”
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Box 5. Recommended indicators for gender gaps related to use and control over labor: 
Use: 
 Female labor force participation rate in agriculture (denominator, number of people in the 
agricultural labor force), same indicator for men 
 Female paid labor force participation rate in agriculture (denominator, number of people in the 
agricultural labor force), same indicator for men 
 The proportion of women who report that they are underemployed. That is, employed ((self-
employed or engaged in wage work) for fewer hours than they want to be), same indicator for 
men  
 Average hours of leisure for women or the proportion of women with inadequate leisure time, 
same indicator for men 
Control: 
 Currently, no recommended indicators. 
 
Indicators of control over labor 
 Indicators of control over labor are very uncommon. Some small-scale studies of the 
impact of access to financial assets on decision-making by women and men do incorporate 
questions on women’s control over labor, as does the Gender Asset Gap Project. However, 
although women’s control over their own and others’ labor is a crucial aspect of gender 
inequality  in agriculture, the existing evidence and sources of data are too scarce for a 
recommendation for any specific indicators of control over labor use following the criteria used 
in this analysis. We do, however, discuss some possibilities below.  
 One indicator with potential is an umbrella question about whether a woman can decide 
how to use her time. For example, the GAGP uses the question “Do (or did) you make the 
decision on whether or not to work” (Deere and Twyman 2012). Although the authors appear to 
be referring to extra-household work, this could be broadened to all SNA work and framed to 
ask whether the man or woman can decide solely or jointly to take up or leave work (whether 
domestic, waged, salaried, or self-employment) or whether someone else decides. A query 
about whether engaging in a particular type of work is “not a decision, based on norms” might 
be especially useful in contexts in which a strict gender division of labor restricts women to 
particular forms of household work (Holvoet 2005). Changes in the proportion of women or men 
who perceive engaging in a particular type of work as a choice proportion could signal a shift in 
the gender division of labor. Garikipati (2008) uses a version of this question, asking women 
whether or not they wanted to change how they used their work time. At least two other studies 
include a version of this question, asking if the “spouse has banned you from working outside 
the home” (Pitt et al 2006, Menon et al 2013). However, when this question refers to all or any 
type of work and is not agriculture-specific, the data will be “blunt” in the sense that they may 
not be sensitive to changes caused by agricultural interventions. 




 A different approach to measuring gender differences in control over labor would be to 
ask individual women and men whether they decide solely, jointly, or not at all about how they 
use their time on a task-by-task basis within the agricultural production cycle. This is resource 
and time intensive. A compromise is to categorize work into agricultural own-farm work, wage 
work, and (non-SNA) domestic labor and ask women and men whether they are able to decide 
how to use their time among different tasks. For example, instead of administering a time-use 
survey, Garikipati (2008) asks a question on whether the woman is able to share a variety of 
domestic chores. This is a less resource intensive way to capture the extent of the “double 
burden.” Another version of this question, used by the WEAI, is more specific to wage or 
salaried work, which, as discussed earlier, is potentially more directly connected to greater 
bargaining power and may also involve challenging gender norms.  
 Resource type: income 
 Women involved in agriculture have little “own” income under their sole control. 
However, women almost always directly contribute to household income in an agricultural 
setting whether it is through paid work or unpaid farming and livestock maintenance.9 To 
capture a gender gap in control over income, it is therefore preferable to address the ways men 
and women use (or decide about the use of) household income rather than focusing narrowly on 
each individual’s “own” income.  
Box 6. Recommended indicators for gender gaps in use and control over income  
 The proportion of women who participate (solely or jointly) in decisions to purchase daily 
goods, same indicator for men 
 The proportion of women who participate (solely or jointly) in decisions to purchase major 
goods, same indicator for men 
 The proportion of women who participate (solely or jointly) in decision-making about income 
from a specific farm enterprise or off-farm employment, same indicator for men 
 
 
Use and control rights over income  
It is difficult to distinguish between indicators of use and indicators of control over 
income by sex. This is primarily because differences between female and male uses of income 
are highly dependent on context. For example, food is commonly treated as a female 
expenditure and goods such as alcohol and tobacco as male expenditure (Hoddinott and 
Haddad 1995, Pitt and Khandker 1998), but these are poorly verified generalizations. The use of 
expenditure proportions on food or alcohol as evidence of female or male “use” of income 
                                               
9 The proportion of women who farm independently of male partners is quite low in Asia and Latin America. The 
proportion of women engaged in paid work in agriculture also varies significantly by region.  




should be avoided. Indicators based on sole or joint participation in decision-making about 
different aspects of the use of income are preferable.  
One way of measuring gender differences in control over income is to compare men’s 
and women’s physical access to earnings. For example, several studies begin with questions 
about physically holding onto or retaining money. Pankaj and Tankha (2010) ask whether the 
woman retains any of her earnings as well as the proportion of wage earnings she hands over 
to someone else in the household. Kabeer and Tran (2000) show that, in Vietnam, in 98% of 
surveyed households, male earners handed over a majority of their earnings to their wives to 
manage. Another way to assess control over income is to ask whether the woman or man 
receives the earnings of other members to manage. Garikipati (2008) asks whether the woman 
retains money from the sale of crops and the sale of livestock; Kabeer et al (2011) ask whether 
the woman retains some income for own use while Jejeebhoy (2000) asks whether she receives 
cash to spend as she chooses. Since this is an important aspect of control over income, we 
recommend an indicator of physical control over household income that is created by asking 
women and men whether they retain any part of their own earnings and/or receive any part of 
the earnings of any others in the household. 
However, questions about participation in decision-making about the use of household 
income are more commonly used than questions about retaining own income or receiving 
income from others in the household. The widely used DHS ask women whether they 
participate in decision-making about daily and major household purchases (Kishor and Subaiya 
2008). Other studies ask more narrowly focused questions: for example, the GAGP asks 
respondents who earn money whether they make the decision on how to spend it (Deere and 
Twyman 2012). This measures only the decision-making of women who report earning their 
own income. Other studies use decisions about specific kinds of purchases, including food, 
jewelry, consumer durables, and various items of expenditure for children (Ashraf et al 2010, 
Kabeer et al 2011). The WEAI is unusual in asking about participation in decision-making based 
upon the source of the income. Respondents are asked about their participation in decision-
making about income generated from (a) food crops, (b) cash crops, (c) livestock production, (d) 
nonfarm activities, and (e) wage and salary work. This specificity is important for detecting how 
changing cropping and livelihood patterns affect gendered control over income but these data 
are not readily available through large international surveys and collection is resource intensive.  
In conclusion, for easy measurement of gender gaps in control over income, we 
recommend the use of an indicator of participation in household expenditure decisions based on 
the Demographic Household Surveys that ask women whether they participate in decision-
making about daily and major household purchases. This provides a field-tested indicator of 
female control over the use of household income, which is more specific than a question about 




household spending in general, and it allows researchers to use the growing database of DHS 
globally. 
Resource type: social capital derived from collective action  
 Participation in collective action that provides access to and influence over social capital 
is treated as a resource for the purposes of this paper because gender gaps in this type of 
social capital affect several outcomes sought by agricultural innovations. For example, access 
to training and information provided through organized groups is a critical input to technology 
choice and to optimal use of new technologies as well as opportunities for credit, marketing, and 
small enterprise development. In addition, group participation can channel access to other 
resources, including water, grazing, and forest as well as inputs such as seed and fertilizer. 
Group participation can also change many of the patterns of decision-making, control, and use 
within the household discussed throughout this paper. Given women’s historic confinement to 
private spaces, participation in public, collective decision-making has symbolic significance but 
is also extremely important for women’s practical and strategic needs (Molyneux 1985). As seen 
earlier, women’s participation in water or forest user groups can shape their ability to secure 
food and affect their time burdens (Agarwal 2010a). Participation in microfinance groups can 
help increase access to credit and thus to assets (Mayoux and Hartl 2009). Technologies 
disseminated through women’s groups can have a more significant impact on livelihood and 
nutrition outcomes than those disseminated through individual male heads of households 
(Kumar and Quisumbing 2011).  
 In the following analysis of indicators, “use” corresponds to participation in collective 
action, defined minimally as being a member of one or more organized groups. Peterman et al 
(2014) distinguish between group membership and political participation, and we address both 
below. The notion of “control” in this context corresponds to influence over group decision-
making. In view of our focus on gender gaps affected by agricultural innovation, we include 
indicators that apply to local-, village-, or district-level collective bodies in preference to national-
level ones. Although data for national-level political participation is readily available, it is unlikely 
to be sensitive to change in gender gaps affected by agricultural innovations. However, to meet 
our criteria that indicators be easily replicable and, to the extent possible, make use of existing 
data, we recommend only indicators that are based on population sampling, rather than 
indicators that require the sampling or observation of groups.
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Box 7. Recommended indicators of gender gaps in participation in collective action  
 Average number of community organizations and/or groups that women are members of, same 
indicator for men 
 Average number of agricultural producer/farmer groups that women are members of, same 
indicator for men 
 The proportion of women who voted (conditional on existence of elections), same indicator for 
men 
 The proportion of women who independently decided how to vote (conditional on voting), same 
indicator for men 
 The proportion of women who attended village council meetings, same indicator for men 
 
Influence related to control: 
 The proportion of women who spoke up at community group/village council meetings, same 
indicator for men 
 The proportion of female leaders and representatives in the village council (publicly available 
data) 
 
Indicators of participation in collective/community bodies 
 Membership in groups is commonly used as an indicator of participation in collective 
action, although the literature makes it clear that mere membership in a group is not the same 
as active participation. Various approaches are in use: for example, the WEAI simply asks 
respondents whether they are members of any village-level group while the World Bank/IFPRI 
(2010) study on gender and governance asked sampled heads of households in India, Ghana, 
and Ethiopia how many village-level groups/collective bodies they took part in. The World 
Bank/IFPRI study found mixed results in terms of gender differences in the number of groups 
that male and female heads belonged to, but it did appear that female heads were less likely to 
be involved in production and farmer-based groups, including agricultural cooperatives. This 
finding is echoed in a number of other studies, suggesting that it is not just the number but the 
kinds of groups that men and women belong to that might be an indicator of greater (or 
reduced) female access to information and social networks that enable agricultural production 
(Davis and Negash 2007, Godquin and Quisumbing 2008). We are especially interested in 
tracking women’s participation in such producer groups. We therefore recommend both an 
aggregate indicator on the number of village-level community organizations that the individual 
belongs to and a sub-indicator that measures the number of agricultural/farmer-based 
organizations that the individual belongs to. 
 As Peterman et al (2014) point out, political participation may not involve group 
membership but is nevertheless an extremely important form of participation in collective 
decision-making. Clearly, not all countries have democratic systems, but, where there are 
established systems of universal franchise at the local level, respondents have been asked 




whether they voted and whether they made the decision of whom to vote for independently (Pitt 
et al 2006, Bali Swain and Wallentin 2007, Menon et al 2013).  
One could also examine the degree to which women participate in the activities of local 
political bodies. As a minimal measure of this, at least three studies include in their measures of 
female empowerment a question on whether respondents had attended a village-level council 
meeting (Pankaj and Tankha 2010, World Bank/IFPRI 2010, Kabeer et al 2011).  
Indicators of influence or control within collective bodies 
 Female membership in collective decision-making bodies does not necessarily translate 
into influence or even voice when their participation is passive. Typically, the opinions of 
marginalized groups such as women are disregarded by ruling elites. Some studies therefore 
probe beyond mere membership in groups: for example, the WEAI asks respondents whether 
they feel comfortable speaking up in public; other studies ask whether women and men have 
actually spoken up in the course of meetings of community groups or local political bodies such 
as village councils (Kabeer et al 2011). Two studies find that, when women occupy leadership 
positions as a result of quotas, the groups make infrastructure investments in public goods that 
more directly serve women (Chattopadhyay and Duflo 2004, Iyer et al 2012).  
Concrete benefits for closing gender gaps can be expected from having more women 
actually serving in positions of power. An indicator based on publically available data that does 
not require a household survey and that meets our other criteria is the proportion of leaders or 
representatives within a local political body who are women. We can expect an increase in 
women serving as leaders in local government to be correlated with improvement in gender 
gaps in agricultural credit, training, and extension.    
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CONCLUSIONS 
 The learning and transparency goals of agricultural research agencies would both be 
served by greater attention to the collection of sex-disaggregated data that can be used to track 
changes in key indicators of gendered use and control of assets and decision-making. Based on 
a review of the literature, this paper suggests criteria for the evaluation of such indicators and 
then recommends a key set of indicators that fit many of these criteria. These indicators are 
chosen to be replicable across international contexts and are sensitive to the impact of 
agricultural R&D interventions without being excessively resource intensive to collect.  
In the last two decades, a few international sources of sex-disaggregated data have 
emerged, but they tend to cover only a few of the recommended indicators and/or a limited set 
of countries. As the review found, most studies of gender in agricultural contexts continue to rely 
on small data samples collected at a single point in time, so that changes cannot be tracked 
over time. Too many studies continue to analyze gender at the level of the sex of the household 
head (most such studies were not reviewed in this document). There is thus a pressing need to 
expand the available sources of sex-disaggregated data on assets using projects such as the 
Gender Asset Gap Project and the WEAI as models.  
 The majority of the indicators recommended in this paper do call for an expanded 
household survey that samples individuals, rather than households, and includes (abbreviated) 
time-use surveys. Such a survey is unlikely to be short. We also argue that wealth gaps are 
likely to be more sensitive and thus useful indicators to track, even while acknowledging that 
they are more complicated to measure than incidence gaps. Finally, the expectation is that data 
will be collected at multiple points in time so that changes in the indicators can be captured.  
The creation of such indicators will therefore require some investment in well-designed 
survey instruments and well-trained enumerators. To the extent that agencies wish to address 
gender inequality, however, we also believe that such an investment is vitally important. In 
supporting such efforts, these agencies would be aiding their own ability to do effective, gender-
aware agricultural research, while also serving the larger community of development 
professionals interested in reducing gender inequality.
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Appendix 1: Indicators of gendered control over common property 
resources that are based on group sampling    
The existing literature on gendered control over common property forest resources is 
primarily based on an analysis of the proportion of women and men within forest user groups 
and requires appropriate sampling of the groups themselves. The primary indicator used in this 
literature is the proportion of women in forest and water user groups. 
Mwangi et al (2011) and Sun et al (2011) used International Forestry Resources and 
Institutions (IFRI) data on the proportion of women in forest user groups across Uganda, Kenya, 
Bolivia, and Mexico to investigate the question of the impact of female participation on common 
property management. In part because of prior gender inequalities in mobility, asset ownership, 
and use and time-use, Mwangi et al (2011) found that female-dominated groups actually 
engaged in less monitoring and were less likely to adopt forest-improving technologies than 
men’s and mixed groups. Sun at al (2011) used the same indicator and found that female-
dominated groups tended to participate in district-level forest decision-making to a smaller 
degree. However, Sun et al (2011) also found that female-dominated groups were less 
exclusionary and sanctioned members less for breaking rules.   
Westermann et al (2005) divided groups into male, female, and mixed on the basis of 
the proportion of female membership of groups and found that the female groups demonstrated 
increased cooperation and solidarity within the group due to greater collaboration both within 
and outside the group (what they call greater relational social capital), thus increasing the 
capacity for self-sustaining collective action. Although the short-run impacts of women’s groups 
on conventional measures of forest quality may not always be positive, there is some evidence 
that the inclusion of women facilitates more rational rule-making by groups and more equal 
sharing of the costs of forest conservation, possibly resulting in more effective and sustainable 
groups in the long run. 
 The primary weakness of all these indicators is the fact that mere membership in the 
user group does not translate into effective control over resource management outcomes. The 
forest user groups Agarwal (2010a) studied had an executive council that drove rule-making 
and enforcement. Agarwal found that a higher percentage of women in the executive councils 
(ECs) of forest management groups has a statistically significant positive correlation with 
various measures of forest quality, although in some cases these results are obtained only if 
women’s membership within the council meets a certain threshold of between 20% and 40% of 
the members. She also found that women’s effective participation could result in more rational 
forest closure rules and thus more ability on the part of women to comply with those rules. In her 
qualitative work, she found evidence that, when women participated more, they also helped 
police the forest by providing information on violators and forming informal forest patrols.  




Agarwal (2010a) thus proposes indicators of substantive female involvement in decision-
making about forest use, including (i) the percentage of EC meetings with no women present, 
(ii) the female attendance rate, (iii) whether women speak up at EC meetings, and (iv) the 
proportion of female office bearers. She finds that each of these measures of substantive 
participation increases when the proportion of women in the EC increases (particularly beyond a 
threshold of 33% membership). These indicators of substantive control over decision-making of 
course require the careful maintenance and analysis of minutes of meetings. They are thus 
more resource intensive and less easily replicable.  
Water resources 
As in the case of forest resources, there is a gender division in the use of water that 
emerges from the gender division of labor in the household. As Zwarteveen and Meinzen-Dick 
(2001) point out, the policy focus on water for agricultural use, which is usually the purview of 
men, has led to the marginalization of women’s water needs. Furthermore, women’s lack of 
rights to land means that even women from landed households are systematically excluded 
from irrigation water user groups, in which the criterion for membership is ownership of irrigated 
land. Fee-based water services can also exclude women who have less access to cash. 
Meanwhile, the rapid privatization of water sources for irrigation as well as for household use 
has further increased the importance of class disparities among women, with women in 
households that own irrigated land more easily able to access water for household as well as 
extra-household uses.  
The growing literature on gender and water raises these concerns about the neglect of 
women’s water needs and the consequent differential impacts on their time and income poverty, 
as well as the negative health outcomes that result from the use of unsanitary water for drinking, 
cooking, and cleaning.  Unfortunately, there appear to be few quantitative empirical studies of 
the effects of women’s control over water along the lines of those discussed for forests earlier, 
although some studies document (rather than analyze) the gender division of labor in water-
related tasks and even the extent of participation by women in water user groups (UN 2006, 
Crow and Sultana 2002, Faisal and Kabir 2015). 
As part of an effort to highlight these issues, the WWAP is developing five baskets of 
indicators, of which two (relating to governance and income generation from water) are pertinent 
to our discussion (WWAP 2014) . One relevant indicator the WWAP recommends is the 
proportion of women to men in water user groups. For forests, these are data that the IFRI is 
already collecting; for water, these are data that the WWAP intends to collect. It is conceivable 
then that a coordinated effort on this particular piece of data may be able to cover a fairly large 
number of countries.  
 The WWAP also suggests indicators that address substantive participation by women in 
such groups. In particular, it proposes an indicator that measures the “ratio of contributions in 




decision-making meetings by women and men, and the percentage of decisions adopted from 
women’s contributions in meetings.” Although extremely valuable information, this is likely to 
require close monitoring of group meetings and to be quite expensive to collect. As discussed in 
the case of forest resources, a simpler but more subjective piece of information would be to 
track the proportion of women (versus men) who reported speaking in meetings of the group 
(conditional upon participation in user groups). Of course, as with participation in forest groups, 
participation by women in water user groups does not always result in decisions that fully 
consider women’s needs and interests (Khosla and Pearl 2003, Cleaver and Hamada 2010).   
  




Appendix 2: Tables   
Table 1: List of indicators with formulae and findings from the literature review 










indicator (as well 
as small-scale 
studies) 
Land       
Ownership      
Proportion of women and 
proportion of men who own land  
# of women who own land/ 
# of women in the sample 
population;  
# of men who own land/ # of 
men in the sample 
population 
None Yes 
The average area of land owned 
by women and by men 
Total land area owned by 
women/ # of land-owning 
women;  
total land area owned by 
men/ # of land-owning men 
None  
The average sale value of the 
land owned by women and by 
men 
Total land value owned by 
women/# of land-owning 
women;  
total land value owned by 
men/# of land-owning men 
None  
Use    
Proportion of women and of men 
who participate in decision-
making whether to sell or 
consume crops  
# of women who 
participate/# of women in 
sample population;                
# of men who participate/# 




    
Proportion of women and of men 
participating in decisions about 
the agricultural use of land: 
 
 
For each decision:  
   
(a) crop choice, (b) choice of 
inputs, (c) timing of cropping, (d) 
sale/transfer of land 
# of women who 
participate/# of women in 
sample population;                
 # of men who participate/# 
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studies using the 
indicator (as well as 
small-scale 
studies) 
Livestock      
Ownership      
The proportion of women and 
the proportion of men who own 
livestock (preferably by livestock 
type, for example: poultry, sheep 
and goats, cattle) 
# of women who own 
livestock/# of women in 
sample population;  
# of men who own 




The average TLU owned by 
women and by men 
TLU owned by women/# of 
livestock-owning women;                                                 
TLU owned by men /# of 
livestock-owning men 
None  
Use    
The proportion of women and 
the proportion of men who 
participate in decisions about the 
use of dairy products from 
livestock (eggs, milk, etc.) 
For each decision: None  
The proportion of women and 
the proportion of men who 
participate in decisions about the 
use of meat (when livestock are 
slaughtered) 
# of women who 
participate/# of livestock 
owning women;                
 # of men who participate/# 




    
Livestock: Proportion of women 
and the proportion of men 
participating in decisions about 
the sale or slaughter of livestock 
# of women who 
participate/# of women in 
sample population;                
# of men who participate/# 
of men in sample population 
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indicator (as well 
as small-scale 
studies) 
Water and Forest Resources      
Use     
Proportion of women and the 
proportion of men able to access  
water, firewood and fodder to 
the desired degree 
# of women who 
participate/# of women in 
sample population;                
# of men who participate/# 







Number of hours (per week, per 
person) for women and for men 
in the household spent on 
collecting water,firewood and 
fodder 
Sum of # of hours spent by 
each woman;  





    
The proportion of women and 
the proportion of men who are 
members of a water or forest 
user group 
# of women who report 
membership/# of women in 
sample population;  
# of men who report 
membership/# of men in 
sample population 
Membership 
may not mean 
influence 
Yes 
The proportion of women and 
the proportion of men who have 
ever attended user group 
meetings (conditional upon 
membership) 
# of women who report 
attendance/# of women who 
report membership;  
# of men who report 
attendance/# of men who 
report membership 
Attendance 
may not mean 
influence 
 
The proportion of women and 
the proportion of  men who 
report ever having spoken at 
user group meetings (conditional 
upon membership) 
# of women who report 
speaking/# of women who 
report membership; 
 # of men who report 
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indicator (as well 
as small-scale 
studies) 
Financial Assets      
 
Use 
    
Proportion of women and the 
proportion of men banked 
(individually or jointly) in a formal 
sector institution 
# of women banked/# of 
women in sample 
population;  
# of men banked/# of men 
in sample population 
Having an 
account may 
not have the 
same impact 
as actively 
using it  
Yes 
The average duration for women 
and the average for men of 
participation in a micro-/informal 
financial institution 
Average of numbers of 
years of member ship for 
women per woman 
member;  Average of 
number of years of 











Proportion of women and the 
proportion of men who have 
saved money in the last 12 
months through a formal or 
informal institution (i.e., not 
"under the pillow") 
# of women who report 
saving money/ # of women 
in sample population;  
# of men who report saving 








Proportion of women and the 
proportion of men who received 
a loan in the last 12 months from 
a formal or informal institution 
# of women who report a 
loan/# of women in sample 
population;  
# of men who report a 
loan/# of men in sample 
population 
The impact of 
the loan may 
be different 
depending on 
whether it is 
asset debt or 
expense debt 
Yes 
    
Control       
Proportion of women and the 
proportion of men who decided 
how to use the loan/savings 
amounts (conditional upon 
saving, access to loan) 
# of women who 
participated in decision/ # of 
women;  
# of men who participated 
in decision/ # of men 
None Yes 
 
Proportion of women who 
acquired ownership stake in the 
asset, conditional upon asset 
use of loan 
 
# of women who acquired 
stake/ # of women who 
received loan;  
# of men who acquired 
stake / # of men who 
received loan 
 Yes 




Proportion of women and 
proportion of men responsible 
for repayment of the loan 
(conditional upon loan receipt) 
# of women who are 
responsible/ # of women 
who received loan;  
# of men who are 





onerous in the 

















Caveats in the 
literature 







studies using the 
indicator (as well 
as small-scale 
studies) 
Labor10       
Use      
Female labor force participation 
rate and male rate in agriculture 
(denominator, size of agricultural 
labor force) 
# of women performing 
agricultural SNA work/ # of 
individuals performing or 
seeking agricultural SNA 
work;  
# of men performing 
agricultural SNA work/ # of 
individuals performing or 










Female paid labor force 
participation rate and male rate 
in agriculture (denominator, size 
of agricultural labor force) 
 
# of women performing or 
seeking agricultural SNA 
work for wages/ # of 
individuals performing or 
seeking agricultural SNA 
work;  
# of men performing or 
seeking agricultural SNA 
work for wages/ # of 
individuals performing or 









Proportion of women and 
proportion of men who report 
that they are underemployed 
(employed for fewer hours than 
they want to be) 
 
# of women who report 
underemployment/# of 
women performing 
agricultural SNA work; # of 
men who report 
underemployment/# of men 




Average hours of leisure for 
women and average hours for 
men or proportion of women and 
proportion of men who report 
inadequate leisure time 
# of hours of leisure 
reported by women/# of 
women in sample 
population;  
# of hours of leisure 
reported by men/# of men 
in sample population 
 Yes 
Control      
No recommended indicators; see text for suggestions   
                                               
10 SNA: UN System of National Accounts 
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Income     
Proportion of women and 
proportion of men who retain any 
part of their own earnings and/or 
receive any part of the earnings 
of any others in the household 
# of women who answer 
yes/# of women in sample 
population;  
# of men who answer yes/# 
of men in sample 
population 
  
Proportion of women and 
proportion of men who 
participate in decisions to 
purchase daily goods 
 
For each: 
# of women who 
participate/# of women in 
sample population;               
# of men who participate/# 
of men in sample 
population 
 Yes 
Proportion of women and 
proportion of men who 
participate in decisions to 
purchase major goods 
 Yes 
Proportion of women and 
proportion of men who 
participate in decision-making 
about income generated from (a) 
food crops, (b) cash crops, (c) 
livestock production, (d) nonfarm 
activities, and (e) wage and 
salary work 
 # of women who 
participate/# of women in 
sample population;               
# of men who participate/# 








Table 1 contd: List of indicators with formulae and findings from the literature review 
Community Groups      
Participation     
Average number of community 
organizations/groups that 
women are members of and 
average number that men are 
members of 
Sum of # reported by each 
woman/ # of women in 
sample population;  
sum of # reported by each 







Average number of agricultural 
producer/farmer groups women 
are members of and average 
number that men are members 
of 
Sum of # reported by each 
woman /# of women in 
sample population;  
sum of # reported by each 







Proportion of women and 
proportion of men who attended 
village council meetings 
# of women who report 
attendance/# of women 
who report membership;  
# of men who report 







Indicators of influence/control     
Proportion of women and 
proportion of men who spoke up 
at community group/village 
council meetings 
# of women who report 
speaking/# of women who 
report membership; # of 
men who report speaking/ 
# of men who report 
membership 
  
Proportion of female leaders and 
proportion of male leaders who 
are representatives in the village 
council (publicly available data) 
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Table 2: Evaluation of indicators: resource intensity, replicability, and time sensitivity 
Note: Ownership and decision-making here refer to sole and joint combined. However, data 
should be collected separately on sole and joint ownership and participation in decision-making. 
 
Indicator Resource intensity of data collection Replicability Time sensitivity 



















Land             
Ownership             
Proportion of 
women/men who 
own land  
  GAGP, LSMS-
ISA 







  Yes 
The average area of 
land owned by 
women and the 
average owned by 
men 
  GAGP, some 
LSMS-ISA 







  Yes 
The average sale 
value of the land 
owned by women 
and the average 
sale value of land 
owned by men 
  GAGP   If no effective 
land markets 
Yes   
Use             
Proportion of women 
and proportion of 
men who participate 
in decision-making 
about the use of 
crops (sale versus 
own-consumption) 
          Yes 
Control             
Proportion of 
women and 




use of land: 
(a) crop choice, 
(b) choice of 
inputs, (c) timing 
of cropping, (d) 
sale/transfer of 
land 
  FAO gender 











on the nature 






  Yes 
 
 




Table 2 contd: Evaluation of indicators: resource intensity, replicability, and time 
sensitivity 
Indicator Resource intensity of data collection Replicability Time sensitivity 
Livestock       
Ownership             
The proportion of 
women and the 
proportion of men 
who own livestock 
(preferably by 
livestock type, for 
example: poultry, 
sheep and goats, 
cattle) 
  WEAI (does not 





  Livestock 
categories must 
be broad 
enough to cover 
local variations 
Yes    
The average TLU 
owned by women 
and the average 
TLU owned by men 
    Yes   Yes    
Average sale value 
of livestock owned 
by women and the 
average sale value 
of livestock owned 
by men 
    Yes   Yes    
Use             
The proportion of 
women and the 
proportion of men 
who participate in 
decisions about 








    Yes  
The proportion of 
women and the 
proportion of men 
who participate in 
decisions about 
the use of meat 
(when livestock 
are slaughtered) 




    Yes  
Control             
Livestock: the 
proportion of 
women and the 
proportion of men 
participating in 
decisions about 
the sale or 
slaughter of 
livestock 
  WEAI       Yes 
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Table 2 contd: Evaluation of indicators: resource intensity, replicability, and time 
sensitivity 
Indicator Resource intensity of data collection Replicability Time sensitivity 
Water and Forest 
Resources 
            
Use             
Proportion of 
women and the 
proportion of men 
able to access 
water,firewood 
and fodder to the 
desired degree 




  Better-off 
households/re
gions may not 
perceive 
shortages 
Yes   
Number of hours 
(per week, per 
person) for women 













    Yes   
Control             
The proportion of 
women and the 
proportion of men 
who are members 
of a water or forest 
user group 






  Groups may 
not exist in 
particular 
regions 
Yes   
The proportion of 
women and the 
proportion of men 





      Groups may 






Yes   
The proportion of 
women and the 
proportion of men 
who report ever 











  Groups may 




















Table 2 contd: Evaluation of indicators: resource intensity, replicability, and time 
sensitivity 
Indicator Resource intensity of data collection Replicability Time sensitivity 
Financial Assets             
Use             
Proportion of 
women and the 
proportion of men 
banked 
(individually or 
jointly) in a formal 
sector institution 





Yes   
The average 
length of time 
(duration) for 
women and the 
average for men  
of participation in 
a micro-  or 
informal financial 
institution 
    Yes     Yes 
Proportion of 
women and the 
proportion of men 
who saved money 
in the last 12 
months through a 
formal or informal 
institution (i.e., not 
"under the pillow") 
Findex       Yes   
Proportion of 
women and the 
proportion of men 
who received a 
loan in the last 12 
months from a 
formal or informal 
institution 
Findex       Yes   
  




Table 2 contd: Evaluation of indicators: resource intensity, replicability, and time 
sensitivity 
Indicator Resource intensity of data collection Replicability Time sensitivity 
Water and Forest 
Resources 
            
Use             
Proportion of 
women and the 
proportion of men 
able to access 
water/firewood/fod
der/fish to the 
desired degree 




  Better-off 
households/re
gions may not 
perceive 
shortages 
Yes   
Number of hours 
(per week, per 
person) for women 













    Yes   
Control             
The proportion of 
women and the 
proportion of men 
who are members 
of a water or forest 
user group 






  Groups may 
not exist in 
particular 
regions 
Yes   
The proportion of 
women and the 
proportion of men 





      Groups may 






Yes   
The proportion of 
women and the 
proportion of men 
who report ever 











  Groups may 






  Yes 
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Table 2 contd: Evaluation of indicators: resource intensity, replicability, and time 
sensitivity 
Indicator Resource intensity of data collection Replicability Time 
sensit
ivity 
Financial Assets             
Use             
Proportion of women 
and the proportion of 
men banked 
(individually or 
jointly) in a formal 
sector institution 





Yes   
The average length 
of time (duration) for 
women and the 
average for men  of 
participation in a 
micro-  or informal 
financial institution 
    Yes     Yes 
Proportion of women 
and the proportion of 
men who saved 
money in the last 12 
months through a 
formal or informal 
institution (i.e., not 
"under the pillow") 
Findex       Yes   
Proportion of women 
and the proportion of 
men who received a 
loan in the last 12 
months from a 
formal or informal 
institution 
Findex       Yes   
Control              
Proportion of 
women and the 
proportion of men 
who decided how 




saving, access to 
loan) 
    Yes     Yes 
Conditional upon 




stake in the asset 
  GAGP       Yes 





women and the 
proportion of men 
responsible for 
repayment of the 
loan (conditional 
upon loan receipt) 
  GAGP     Yes   
Table 2 contd: Evaluation of indicators: resource intensity, replicability, and time 
sensitivity 
Indicator Resource intensity of data collection Replicability Time 
sensit
ivity 
Labor             
Use             
Female  labor force 
participation rate 
and the male rate in 
agriculture 
(denominator, size 










  Yes 
Female  paid labor 
force participation 
rate and the male 
rate in agriculture 
(denominator, size 













  Yes 
Proportion of women 
and the proportion of 
men who report that 
they are 
underemployed 
(employed for fewer 
hours than they 
want to be) 
    Yes   Yes   
Average hours of 
leisure for women 
and the average for 
men;  or the 
proportion of women 
and  the proportion 
of men who report 
inadequate leisure 
time 
  WEAI, national 
time-use 
surveys 
      Yes 
Control             
No recommended 
indicators; see text 
for suggestions 
            
  




Table 2 contd: Evaluation of indicators: resource intensity, replicability, and time 
sensitivity 
Indicator Resource intensity of data collection Replicability Time 
sensit
ivity 
Control             
No recommended 
indicators; see text 
for suggestions 
            
Income             
Proportion of 
women and the 
proportion of men 
who retain any 
part of their own 
earnings and/or 
receive any part of 
the earnings of 
any others in the 
household 
    Yes     Yes 
Proportion of 
women and the 
proportion of men 




DHS         YES 
Proportion of 
women and the 
proportion of men 




DHS         YES 
Proportion of 
women and the 
proportion of men 
who participate in 
decision-making 
about income 
generated from (a) 
food crops, (b) 




and (e) wage and 
salary work 
  WEAI       YES 
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Table 2 contd: Evaluation of indicators: resource intensity, replicability, and time 
sensitivity 





            




ps that  women 
are members of, 
average that men 
are members of 












y bodies  






members of, that 
men are members 
of 







Yes   
Proportion of 
women and 













            
Proportion of 
women and 
proportion of men 

















  Yes 
Proportion of 
female leaders 
and proportion of 
male leaders who 
are 
representatives in 
the village council 
(publicly available 
data) 







  Yes 
 
 
